Doubao Work and WorkBuddy Compete for Office Agent: ByteDance and Tencent's Open Strategies and User Gap
ByteDance's Doubao Work and Tencent's WorkBuddy are competing over office Agent, with both advancing openness in November: Doubao Work integrated third-party models such as Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek and launched a workbench covering 21 professional scenarios, while WorkBuddy is compatible with third-party IM and enterprises' own systems. Citing Analysys data, the article states that in September WorkBuddy's desktop visits reached 85 million, while Doubao Work exceeded 30 million; QuestMobile estimates that Doubao Work's desktop MAU is about 2.049 million, while WorkBuddy's MAU across three platforms exceeds 32 million. The author believes that the two companies' models will find it difficult to catch up with SOTA in the short term, and that the barrier for office Agent lies in office context rather than the model itself.
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The article compares ByteDance's Doubao Work and Tencent's WorkBuddy in terms of open strategies and user data, and outlines the reasons why office Agent has become a focal point of competition between the two companies.
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A few days ago, the latest internal speeches by Zhang Yiming and Pony Ma were both made public at the same time.
Zhang Yiming talked about technology. He rallied ByteDance's AI team, saying they have the ability to compete with top players such as Anthropic and OpenAI at the technological frontier, while reiterating that ByteDance should not rely on distillation but should focus on long-term strategy.
Pony Ma talked about the team. His remarks revealed a stronger sense of crisis and carried a sharper tone of admonishment; he hoped that "both people and the organization need major adjustments" and also proposed a new approach of "50% army + 50% navy."
After these rallying calls, what specifically should be done?
At present, the most conspicuous move is that both companies are deploying their forces to fight for the highly valuable battlefield of office agents.
ByteDance's spearhead is Doubao Work, while Tencent's is WorkBuddy.
Both products have been online for only a few months, yet they are highly valued across their entire companies and have received a large tilt of resources. Liang Rubo and Pony Ma have respectively endorsed and spoken for them, making them veritable "CEO projects."
In early November, the two main players dueled again, with the keyword being "openness."
Doubao Work fully integrated third-party models such as Kimi, GLM, and DeepSeek, putting them on par with its own Doubao model, allowing users to choose freely.
On November 16, Doubao Work also launched a "Workbench" feature, initially covering 21 professional scenarios including finance, healthcare, and education. It presets the skills and tools required for different professional scenarios to lower the barrier to using AI, and it has similarities with WorkBuddy's "Projects" feature.
WorkBuddy, meanwhile, integrates internally with WeCom and Tencent's office ecosystem, and is externally compatible with third-party IM and enterprises' own business systems. It will further open up its product architecture to support enterprises' self-developed agents, third-party agents, and third-party communication systems.
As for models, the options it offers have always been abundant and are not limited to Tencent Hy.
Both convey the same attitude:
As long as you are willing to use my office agent, whether you use my model, my agent, or my office software is entirely left to the user to choose.
The "Shangganling" of office agents has become the number one battlefield for ByteDance and Tencent.
1
Office agents are not the main battlefield of the global AI industry; leading companies place more importance on foundation models, especially Anthropic and OpenAI.
ByteDance and Tencent, however, need to find another path and bet on office agents.
The direct reason is simple: they have realized that their own models lag behind SOTA and cannot catch up in a short time.
As Zhang Yiming said, ByteDance has the ability to compete with O and A, but truly catching up to the technological frontier will take until 2029 or 2030 at the earliest.
As for Tencent, Hy has made significant progress under Yao Shunyu's leadership, but it cannot be called globally leading either.
It stated in an announcement: "Although Hy4 is already one of the strongest open-source models currently available, there is still a considerable gap between it and top closed-source models, especially on internally built high-difficulty test sets such as frontier mathematics, long-horizon development, model iteration, and visual question answering."
It is not hard to see that the focal battle for the two giants at this stage is not to crush the other's model—"two weak chickens pecking at each other" is meaningless—but rather the battle of applications, at which established internet companies excel.
The AI application most worth doing right now is the office agent.
Among various types of agents, office agents are one of the few applications that can deliver clear output and whose economics add up, and usage has been rising rapidly.
According to Analysys calculations, in September this year, visits to 20 mainstream domestic desktop office agents exceeded 300 million, a fourfold increase compared with June. This is a growth rate that all internet products—including the currently booming free short dramas—find hard to match.
At the same time, office agents charge seat fees; an enterprise customer needs to purchase dozens or even hundreds of employee accounts, and the unit price is higher. Their ARPU is an order of magnitude higher than C-end AI subscriptions, and the commercial prospects are much broader.
In addition to direct charging, another monetization scenario for office agents is building brand reputation among programmers, professionals, and enterprises, thereby driving the growth of AI cloud services.
Office scenarios contain a large number of complex, long-horizon, multimodal tasks, and token consumption far exceeds that of other scenarios. Therefore, controlling the AI office entrance through office agents is equivalent to directly controlling the flow valve for office tokens, thereby driving revenue growth for AI clouds that provide MaaS services.
The two giants have already realized this.
Tencent, for its part, gave the latest Hy4 model its debut in WorkBuddy, with striking results—a few days later, surging traffic prompted an emergency tenfold expansion of WorkBuddy's inference cluster.
It can be said that whoever captures office agents occupies the first foothold of the token economy.
In this battle, both giants have also gained a new understanding: the model is not the real moat.
For an office agent to retain users, it cannot rely solely on model capabilities, because new models will always keep iterating, and no one can guarantee always being able to offer the strongest model at the lowest price.
Its real barrier is the accumulated office context: an enterprise's internal workflows, proprietary knowledge, chat records, emails, documents, schedules, meetings, and so on. The key reason users are willing to keep using and paying is that the more they use it, the less they can leave it, and switching costs gradually rise.
One piece of supporting evidence: in the first quarter of this year, the active user retention rate of Tencent WorkBuddy and CodeBuddy exceeded 60%, and the paid user retention rate exceeded 80%—these users clearly did not stay because of the Hy model's performance.
Under these circumstances, if ByteDance and Tencent rigidly stick to their own models, they will not only fail to form a competitive advantage, but will also be left behind by the more open and inclusive side.
WorkBuddy chose to be inclusive early on. Doubao Work opened third-party models to teams and enterprise customers at the end of October, and fully opened them in early November.
Neither of the two major office Agents uses the model as a threshold anymore. If one day Doubao Work integrates Hy and WorkBuddy integrates Doubao, it may not be surprising.
This choice has much in common with the hugely popular DeepSeek Harness.
Although the three are not the same type of product, they all put models in a "drop-down menu" that users can change at any time. They travel along different paths, yet independently reach the same conclusion: models are being downgraded from products to components; only by mastering more "work time" can one occupy the competitive high ground.
2
The battle over office Agents is a relatively rare case in recent years of "ByteDance chasing Tencent."
WorkBuddy is one of the few Tencent AI products that is significantly ahead of ByteDance.
It launched in March this year, seizing a five-month market gap. Two months later, Tencent claimed in its financial report that it was China's most popular productivity AI agent service.
At that time, ByteDance's layout in office Agents was not yet comprehensive enough, relying mainly on TRAE, which focuses on AI Coding, and Coze to hold the fort, and it was clearly at a disadvantage in the competition.
By July, a report by Analysys said that Tencent's office Agents, with WorkBuddy at the core, had captured about 32 million desktop visits; ByteDance's side had only 14 million.
In the following months, WorkBuddy absorbed QClaw and fully connected with WeCom, and its feature matrix and social capabilities continued to strengthen.
By contrast, ByteDance did not launch Doubao Professional Edition until the end of June. At the end of July, Doubao absorbed the Feishu product team, and at the end of August it integrated TRAE and Coze, officially launching Doubao Work.
But the gap between the two is still widening. In September, WorkBuddy's desktop visits rose to 85 million, while Doubao Work exceeded 30 million. Although the latter more than doubled, it actually fell further behind the former.
ByteDance clearly could not accept this situation. Management began to speak out publicly.
At the mid-year all-hands meeting in early August, Liang Rubo listed Doubao as a "mainstay" business. At the Feishu conference in mid-September, Liang Rubo said again that ByteDance would invest more resources and strength in the enterprise market.
Under internal and external pressure, Doubao Work had to take tough measures.
One tough measure was to give users the right to choose models and voluntarily retreat to the position of an Agent workbench. But this was far from enough—WorkBuddy had already done so long ago. It also needed to offer something different from its rival.
For example, token discounts. In early November, WorkBuddy canceled the 50% points discount for DeepSeek V4.1 Flash as planned and restored the original price.
A week later, for this popular model, Doubao launched a limited-time offer of 0.01x consumption, essentially equivalent to free use. Although this small move had limited impact, it also reflected Doubao Work's determination to win.
But relying only on model price cuts clearly cannot win the entire battle. For Doubao Work to catch up with WorkBuddy, ByteDance ultimately still needs to play the Doubao App card well.
At present, Doubao's MAU has reached as high as 419 million, far ahead of other rivals, but it has not injected users into Doubao Work.
According to QuestMobile estimates, in September Doubao Work's desktop MAU was only 2.049 million, equivalent to 0.5% of Doubao App. In the same period, WorkBuddy's MAU across three platforms (desktop, web, and mobile) exceeded 32 million.
Of course, strictly speaking, this comparison is not fair: Doubao Work only has a desktop version and had just been online for one month at the time, but a more than tenfold gap in monthly active users is still too large.
On desktop, Doubao is already almost on par with Doubao Work, and their UI and feature matrices are becoming increasingly similar. The real big head is still the App side: Doubao Work still has no standalone App, and no matter how much traffic or how many users Doubao App has, it cannot directly translate into downloads of Doubao Work.
Over the past three months, Doubao Work has mainly been catching up—catching up on organization, capabilities, models, and pricing—and its product form is getting closer and closer to WorkBuddy. But for the most critical lesson, user volume, Doubao Work must have Doubao App help it catch up.
3
In building office Agents, the two giants each have their own advantages and have both adopted a posture of investing substantial resources. This also means that some businesses with no visible prospects for the time being will find it difficult to obtain group-level investment.
Among them is Personal Agent.
For some time, driven by Meta Muse, major foreign companies have successively entered the Personal Agent space. There have also been many developments in China, with ByteDance, Tencent, and Alibaba all having related plans.
ByteDance in particular: not long ago, reports said that ByteDance's Personal Agent is expected to be officially released in the coming weeks. This planned product will benchmark against Meta Muse, but it is not yet clear whether ByteDance will follow Meta in launching supporting hardware.
But to this day, neither the ByteDance version of Muse nor the Personal Agent version of Yuanbao has become a reality. The three giants once struck the posture of a major battle over Personal Agent, yet now they are holding their fire.
This may indicate that the management of ByteDance and other major companies harbor doubts about Personal Agent.
English text is being prepared.
If Chinese users encounter such problems, their first reaction is to open the relevant App and look for customer service; if that really doesn't work, they can also complain online. If a third-party AI were asked to help solve it, efficiency would be low, speed slow, and extra token costs would be incurred.
A decade-long golden age of mobile internet has allowed users, enterprises, and platforms to adapt to one another and jointly form the world's most developed and active online-offline commercial ecosystem. Almost everything Personal Agent can do already has an App or mini-program occupying the ecological niche, with established mindshare and customer bases.
In this ecosystem, the ones providing platforms and infrastructure and taking the largest slice of the cake are ByteDance, Tencent, and Alibaba.
Another major problem with Personal Agent is this: every minute an Agent saves the user is one minute less of user time spent on the platform. As an efficiency tool, its underlying logic is to help users save time, eliminate the time and energy consumed browsing websites and Apps, and improve decision accuracy and transaction efficiency.
It lets users skip browsing Apps and various content and go straight to the target goods and services—a radical undermining of the major companies' current business models. This is not a situation the major companies want to see, and it is also the deep-seated reason why their attitude toward Personal Agent turned from hot to cold.
Therefore, the motivation and need for ByteDance and the others to push Personal Agent were not solid from the very beginning.
Moreover, at this stage the major companies have no time to attend to other matters and must use their limited resources where they count most.
On the major companies' AI maps, apart from office Agents, large models, AI plus hardware, and others each have their own strategic value, and their business models are also very clear. If they abandoned the rest and mounted a strong attack on Personal Agent, they would only get half the result with twice the effort, or even damage their commercial foundations.
Doubao Work and WorkBuddy are the hilltops that ByteDance and Tencent are more eager to conquer.
But the problem now is that neither major company can produce a unique competitive weapon. What WorkBuddy can do—such as connecting to third-party models—Doubao Work can also do; the only differences are progress, ecosystem, and software.
This has created a somewhat awkward situation: this major battle for the AI era is being fought in a very "retro" way. The two openly contend and secretly struggle, yet they need to rely on model discount levels to compete for users. The office Agent war has looped back to the old internet-era path of burning money to exchange for users.
To break the deadlock of a zero-sum game, the major companies participating in the competition may still have to return to foundation models—at this stage, everyone's foundation model matrices are about the same; only by producing an exclusive SOTA foundation model and putting it into office Agents at an affordable price will the true watershed of this battle arrive.
This article comes from the WeChat public account "Zimubang" (ID: wujicaijing), author: Yan Fei, published by 36Kr with authorization.