Tan Tan's interpretation of China's AI technology export ban: what it regulates and why it was introduced now

This question can be traced back to October 16. That day, the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Science and Technology publicly solicited opinions on the revision of the Catalogue of Technologies Prohibited or Restricted from Export from China (hereinafter referred to as the Catalogue). Among them were 23 AI-related technologies, including large models, agents, computing power clusters, information processing, and others.

Tan Zhu learned that since the policy was announced, two leading companies, DeepSeek and MiniMax, have smoothly completed registration procedures and completed open-sourcing and overseas authorized use.

In the first half of this year, relevant departments began drafting the consultation draft of this Catalogue, and beforehand widely organized research institutions, industry organizations, and leading companies in the industry to carry out in-depth assessments.

Lawyers Liu Jing and Liu Hongmei of Beijing Dacheng Law Offices participated in these discussions. They shared a detail with Tan Zhu: compared with the initial draft from several months earlier, the control points of some technology items in the AI field had been continuously adjusted in line with the latest industry developments. Many of the concerns and suggestions raised by companies at the meetings were well reflected in the policy released this time.

What they care about more now is whether there will be clearer operational guidelines going forward.

Another detail is that in the relevant Q&A, the Ministry of Commerce gave noticeably more and more specific explanations of "what is not regulated" than of "what is regulated." This also shows that the core of the Catalogue is to draw boundaries, rather than simply restrict the export of AI technology.

Tan Zhu has also sorted out several key points to help everyone understand how this set of rules works.

01 What exactly does this set of rules regulate?

People who do not work in technology can easily confuse "technology export" with "product export." Some may ask: if a restricted-category large model is used to provide API calls, APP/web interaction, SaaS applications, and the like to overseas users, does that fall within the scope of large-model technology export management?

Large models trained using China's core data and then used to provide services are proposed to be prohibited from export; large models trained using important data and then used to provide services are proposed to be restricted from export. Simply put, as long as the model training process involves concerns about national data security, the export of the model will be subject to export constraints regardless of whether the model itself is large or small or how many parameters it has.

Second, sensitive uses.

For example, agent technology that reaches a certain level of performance is itself proposed to be restricted from export; but if this technology is specifically or mainly used in highly sensitive scenarios such as national critical information infrastructure, national defense and military industry, and core government affairs, its nature changes and it is directly upgraded to proposed prohibition of export. The logic conveyed here is very clear: where the same technology is used and for whom it serves determines how strict the regulation it faces will be.

Third, the computing power foundation.

After reading these three points, it becomes clear that this set of rules regulates the underlying logic of technology.

When companies use restricted-category large models to provide API calls, APP/web interaction, SaaS applications, local on-device lightweight deployment, and other such services to overseas users, none of these fall within the scope of large-model technology export management.

Taking into account the practical needs of international cooperation, the Catalogue also sets up two types of facilitation arrangements.

One type is open-source technology and specific international business. For technology exports in situations such as open-sourcing AI-related technologies, Chinese companies building and operating their own computing power centers overseas, going abroad to conduct chip tape-out manufacturing, using overseas resources for joint research and development, and participating in international standard-setting, facilitation measures such as automatic licensing apply, basically achieving "report and export immediately"; for relevant technologies that have already entered the public domain through open-sourcing, publication of academic papers, and other means, they are proposed not to be included in the scope of export management.

Another type is international AI cooperation. For technology exports needed by members of the World AI Cooperation Organization to carry out international cooperation on capacity building, technology sharing, and joint rule-building, more facilitation and support will be provided.

Liu Hongmei told Tan Zhu that after the new rules take effect, technologies in the prohibited export category must not be exported; for technologies in the restricted export category, companies can submit applications to the competent authorities and strive to obtain licenses, and this will not disrupt companies' original overseas layouts and business plans.

This also confirms the domestic position of "encouraging openness." In the face of the new rules, companies can still remain composed.

02 Why push out this set of rules now?

First, differential treatment by country. In January 2025, the U.S. Department of Commerce's Framework for Artificial Intelligence Diffusion had designed management of advanced computing chips and some advanced model weights based on the "sensitivity" of destination regions and other factors, strictly controlling the flow of advanced AI capabilities to specific entities.

Second, dividing circles by camp. Anthropic's CEO once proposed a kind of "alliance strategy": uniting a group of "democratic countries" into a small circle, controlling the AI technology supply chain, drawing more countries in, and isolating opponents.

But China is not taking this path.

This revision is routine work carried out in accordance with laws and regulations. Since 2001, China has adjusted and revised the Catalogue multiple times.

Tan Zhu learned that the focus of management is technology export behavior, not technology itself.

This approach requires the policy to break down control standards in sufficient detail and turn them into objective, quantifiable provisions.

03 Why can China do this?

Since the standards must be detailed and objective, "risk assessment" must be independently verifiable. This leads to a deeper proposition:

Who has the ability to assess risk and implement governance?

On this question, the premise presupposed by the United States is that only when technological capabilities are held in the hands of a few can security be guaranteed.

But from the perspective of technological development, leaders do indeed have an advantage when training frontier large models, but the development of open source is shaking this premise at its root.

First, the threshold for training large models is very high, but the threshold for doing security testing is not that high.

Industry estimates suggest that training a top-tier large model can require tens of thousands of compute cards, but assessing its security risks does not require spending heavily to retrain it from scratch. This breaks the cognitive limitation that "only technology leaders are qualified to conduct risk reviews." More research institutions and even government departments are now able to conduct security testing on large models and reproduce security issues.

Second, thanks to open source, governance capabilities are spreading rapidly.

With open weights, models are no longer entirely a "black box." Security researchers and small and medium-sized technical teams around the world can polish security tools at a relatively low cost.

Since the technical problems can be solved, rule design can pursue more precise implementation results.

This time, the temporary management measures requiring registration before export are intended to grasp in advance the demand for relevant technology exports and make regulation more scientific.

Moreover, to give enterprises a clear and unified set of judgment standards, the Catalog also sets explicit quantitative indicators: for example, computing power exceeding 10²⁶ floating-point operations, more than 2 trillion parameters, and capabilities reaching the global top ten level.

In this way, enterprises no longer need to guess the direction of regulation, and the government can direct limited administrative resources at the links where risks truly exist.

04 Why build a technology import and export management system?

In the past, when facing external technology blockades, we were mostly on the defensive. But as China moves to the forefront of more and more technology fields, how to manage technology has become a new issue.

In this role shift, how to avoid affecting normal commercial cooperation is a problem that had not been fully solved before.

Therefore, the focus of this policy adjustment is not on "how many technologies have been controlled," but on building technology import and export management into a national capability that can operate with precision.

In the future, it will support our participation in global technological competition at two levels:

At the micro level, achieving targeted interception.

Undercurrents still exist in international technological competition, and the pressure to prevent core technologies from being illegally transferred and to curb sensitive technologies from flowing out disguised as commercial cooperation has always existed. This management mechanism can enable regulators, in the intricate global commercial network, to precisely identify and cut off technology transfers that may endanger national security.

At the macro level, forming the ability to shape rules.

An increasingly obvious trend is that China is no longer a passive recipient of international rules. By establishing transparent, non-discriminatory management standards based on objective technical indicators, China's rules can provide a reference for international technology governance.

In this process, we can use multilateral platforms to discuss the boundaries of AI governance with all parties. When this set of rules is gradually recognized or aligned by more multilateral cooperation mechanisms, China will have more institutional discourse power in the global technological competition.

This technology catalog is only a small step in China's effort to fill the gaps in technology import and export management. But the direction it points to is clear: within the same institutional framework, security bottom lines and open cooperation can absolutely coexist.

Source of this article: Yuyuan Tantian Risk Disclosure and Disclaimer

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