Li Lecheng Appointed Anhui Provincial Party Secretary: How Will Anhui Close the Industrialization Gaps in Its Future Industries?

[[**Li Lecheng has been transferred from Minister of Industry and Information Technology to Anhui Provincial Party Secretary, at a moment when Anhui is shifting from betting on individual companies to cultivating future industrial clusters such as quantum, nuclear fusion, and brain-computer interfaces; his experience in industrial organization fits Anhui's need to bridge the gaps in pilot testing, first orders, and mass production.**

**Key points**

**1. Anhui has upgraded from betting on a single company to possessing an industrial chain**

Changxin Technology's market value on its first day of listing was 3.28 trillion yuan, driving Hefei's integrated circuit output value from 18 billion yuan in 2016 to 151.4 billion yuan in 2025; both vehicle production and export volume rank first in the country.

**2. Future industries have no leaders yet, and Anhui is paving the way for them first**

It is building pilot zones around quantum, nuclear fusion, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, and other fields, revising state-owned capital venture capital assessments to tolerate long-cycle projects, and using government first procurement to create initial orders for new technologies.

**3. The industrialization breakpoint is in the middle segment, and Anhui has begun to fill in the interfaces**

Quantum results are already operating at 220 kV substations, brain-computer interfaces are being promoted into clinical use at top-tier hospitals, and automotive motors, electronic controls, and sensors are migrating to robots; pilot verification platforms receive subsidies of up to 5 million yuan.

**4. Competing on the same stage with Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Beijing, the decisive factor is the speed of industrialization**

Shanghai has set up a 10-billion-yuan future industries fund, Jiangsu is opening up frontier technology scenarios, and Beijing is laying out the same batch of directions; the "proactive door-to-door" cultivation model proposed by Li Lecheng corresponds precisely to Anhui's task of moving from prototypes to mass production. 2026-09-28 17:01 Anhui has finally found someone who understands industry to solve its problems. Capital Doesn't Stay Up Late Quick Read

This article is from the WeChat public account: Capital Doesn't Stay Up Late, author: No Sleep Research Institute

On September 20, Li Lecheng was still at the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology.

That day, he chaired a roundtable for small and medium-sized enterprises. The eight companies sitting on the other side of the table came from fields such as artificial intelligence, commercial aerospace, and quantum technology.

What was discussed at the meeting was not traditional investment promotion either. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology proposed changing the cultivation of high-quality enterprises from "waiting for applications" to "proactively going door to door," finding in advance those enterprises that keep their heads down working on technology and products, and addressing their problems in scenarios, financing, and industrial chain coordination earlier.

Three days later, on September 23, Li Lecheng left the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and took up the post of Anhui Provincial Party Secretary.

Information released by Xinhua News Agency shows that this adjustment was a decision made by the central government based on work needs and the actual situation of building the Anhui provincial leadership team. Li Lecheng previously served as director of the Hubei Provincial Development and Reform Commission, Party Secretary of Xiangyang, Executive Vice Governor of Hubei, and Governor of Liaoning Province, and took up the post of Minister of Industry and Information Technology in April 2025.

Viewed in isolation, this is a job adjustment. But if the adjustment is placed together with Anhui's development in recent years, there is a common intersection: a person who three days earlier was still in Beijing looking for the next batch of industrial enterprises has gone to a province that is looking for the next batch of industry.

In the past, Anhui's most famous story was investing in BOE, investing in Changxin, and rescuing NIO. By 2026, explaining Anhui with "the local government that invests best" is no longer enough. Because those projects that were once regarded as bets have already taken shape and are giving back, and Anhui is still looking for new increments.

In 2025, Anhui's automobile and new energy vehicle output jumped to first place in the country for the first time, and complete vehicle exports exceeded 1 million units for the first time.

On the other side, Changxin Technology, which landed in Hefei, was listed on the STAR Market in July this year, and its total market value on the first day of listing reached 3.28 trillion yuan, vaulting to first place in A-share market value. On August 17, the company's market value reached 4.13 trillion yuan, becoming the first listed company on the A-share market to exceed 4 trillion yuan in market value.

Ten years ago, Changxin was still just a DRAM project that Hefei needed to support with real money.

Ten years later, relying on the Changxin Memory industrial chain, Hefei's integrated circuit industry output value has grown from about 18 billion yuan in 2016 to 151.4 billion yuan in 2025. By early 2026, the city had more than 600 integrated circuit enterprises above designated size, with more than 70,000 employees.

The cards in Anhui's hand are no longer just a few companies; it has begun to possess a batch of industries.

At the same time, another batch of industries that have not even grown leading companies yet has already been put on the table in advance: quantum technology, nuclear fusion, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, biomanufacturing, aerospace information...

Moreover, Anhui has already begun building pilot zones, finding scenarios, conducting pilot testing, and allocating funds for them.

An Anhui that is shifting from "finding companies" to "guiding industries" has welcomed someone who understands industry better.

In the first half of 2026, Anhui produced 1.6867 million vehicles, including 881,800 new energy vehicles; vehicle exports were 1.006 million units, with an export value of 104.36 billion yuan, and all four indicators ranked first in the country.

Hefei has gathered JAC, BYD, NIO, Volkswagen, Changan, and Ankai, while Wuhu has formed another automotive industrial chain around Chery. In Wuhu alone, the number of enterprises above designated size in the automotive industrial chain reached 1,245 in the first half of 2026, including 926 parts enterprises.

But what better demonstrates that Anhui's model can work than automobiles is Changxin.

In 2016, when Hefei decided to launch the DRAM project, this business hardly contained the words "asset-light."

Changxin's first phase had a total investment of 18 billion yuan, of which Hefei Industrial Investment contributed 14.4 billion yuan, accounting for 80%. Since then, state-owned capital from Anhui Province and Hefei City has continued to participate in multiple rounds of financing. The planned total investment of Changxin's 12-inch memory wafer manufacturing base project reached 150 billion yuan.

This was no longer investment promotion in the ordinary sense. A city took out tens of billions of yuan to accompany a company in burning money for ten years, and it was betting on DRAM, a market then controlled by Samsung, SK Hynix, and Micron.

By 2026, this investment has finally begun to pay off.

On July 27, Changxin Technology went public, and its market value at the close on the first day reached 3.28 trillion yuan, directly making it the highest-valued company on the A-share market. Based on the first-day share price and the holdings of the broad Hefei state-owned capital platforms, the book value of the relevant shares exceeds 1 trillion yuan; the book value corresponding to the stake held by Anhui Provincial Investment Group also exceeds 200 billion yuan.

Two months later, the market is still pricing it at a market value of 4 trillion yuan.

But for Anhui, market value is not all that Changxin left behind. In 2016, the output value of Hefei's integrated circuit industry was about 18 billion yuan. By 2025, it had reached 151.4 billion yuan.

After Changxin landed, Hefei continued to fill in links in wafer manufacturing, chip design, equipment, materials, and other segments. By early 2026, the city had more than 600 integrated circuit enterprises above designated size, with more than 70,000 employees.

What a government investment ultimately grew was not just a stock certificate. It made more design, manufacturing, materials, and equipment companies begin to gather around this city.

This is also where the "Hefei model" is most easily misread. Outsiders like to say it "gambled" and won, but what Anhui actually gained later was not a few investment returns, but a gradually complete industrial system.

The automobile industry confirmed this model even earlier.

In the past, local government found money and factories for NIO. Now the automobile industry can already export motors, electronic controls, sensors, supply chains, and manufacturing capabilities to robotics.

In 2025, the added value of Anhui's electronic information manufacturing industry above designated size grew by 40.9%, accounting for 12.6% of the province's industrial added value, with a contribution rate to industrial growth of 42.2%.

In 2025, Anhui's artificial intelligence enterprises above designated size achieved revenue of 246.55 billion yuan, and its industrial development evaluation ranked fifth nationwide. In the first half of 2026, the province's humanoid robot output was 2,665 units, and enterprises across the robot industry chain exceeded 660.

Over the past decade or so, what Anhui solved was a single problem: finding a company that could change a city, and also figuring out how to attract it to settle there.

Today, that problem is no longer as scarce as before. Chery, Changxin, BOE, NIO, and iFlytek are all already at the table.

What comes next is harder: before a leader emerges, it must judge which technology will become an industry.

Released in 2024, the "Anhui Province Future Industry Development Action Plan" proposed the "7+N" future industry cultivation project, covering quantum technology, aerospace information, general intelligence, low-carbon energy, and other directions.

One sentence in it differs from the logic of investment attraction back then. From "source innovation—technology transformation—product development—scenario application—industrialization—industrial clusters," it connects the road section by section.

Anhui's bet on future industries is not just setting up a fund; it is doing four things at the same time.

First, define the places first.

Anhui began building future industry science and technology parks and provincial future industry pilot zones. For those entering the list of provincial future industry pilot zones under preparation, the provincial finance department gives the host city up to 10 million yuan in awards and subsidies based on task completion; for successfully creating a national-level future industry pilot zone, another 10 million yuan is awarded.

The money is not large; its role is to first gather technologies such as quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces, and embodied intelligence from scattered laboratories and startup teams into one industrial space.

Second, change the money of state-owned capital.

In its future industry policy, Anhui specifically revised the assessment methods for state-owned venture capital. It no longer measures funds by whether individual projects made money, nor does it use profit or asset returns as key indicators. Instead, it allows funds to be assessed according to overall operating results and requires increasing the weight of the effectiveness of future industry projects.

At the same time, it integrates existing funds in the provincial emerging industry guidance fund, sets up funds aimed at future industries, and allows government funds, local governments, and enterprises to set up sub-funds together.

Put plainly, this allows state-owned capital to wait longer and to invest in projects that show no profit in the short term. This matters greatly for future industries.

Changxin needed 18 billion yuan in first-phase investment back then; quantum, brain-computer interfaces, and fusion face troubles even earlier; many teams do not even have a factory, only papers, patents, and prototypes. If the assessment methods for state-owned venture capital were not revised, these companies would basically find it very hard to enter Anhui's investment list.

Third, find them their first customer.

Anhui proposes that by 2030 it will build about 100 benchmark application scenarios and commercial solutions for future industries, about 100 provincial future scenario laboratories, and about 30 provincial future scenario pilot zones.

Anhui even wrote "government first purchase and ordering" directly into the policy, supporting the government in sharing R&D risks with enterprises through cooperative innovative procurement and purchasing innovative products as agreed in R&D contracts. For eligible benchmark application scenarios, the policy also gives up to 1 million yuan in rewards per project.

Quantum can first enter communications and power; brain-computer interfaces can first enter hospitals and rehabilitation; robots can first enter automobile factories and 4S stores; AI can directly enter automobiles, cement, and equipment manufacturing. For these industries, the first government, hospital, state-owned enterprise, or factory customer is sometimes more important than a round of financing.

Fourth, fill in the missing bridge between laboratories and factories.

In Anhui's policies, "concept validation," "pilot testing," "science and technology parks," and "application scenarios" appear repeatedly. For concept validation centers and pilot validation platforms built in pilot zones, Anhui provides subsidies of 20% of fixed asset investment, with a maximum of 5 million yuan per platform.

The reason is simple: papers cannot directly generate revenue. Between a technology and a product lie prototypes, small-batch trial production, reliability testing, certification, procurement, and mass production. In the past, Anhui was good at stepping in after a company had proven its business model; now it is starting to push government resources earlier.

But Anhui is not running this race alone.

Shanghai has already established a 10 billion yuan future industries fund, fully funded by the municipal government, with a fund term that can be extended to as long as 18 years, explicitly seeking projects in brain-computer interfaces, controllable nuclear fusion, quantum computing, synthetic biology, and other fields. Shanghai has also issued dedicated plans for brain-computer interfaces and other areas, and is building future industry clusters.

In embodied intelligence, Shanghai's Xuhui District provides up to 20 million yuan for key projects and up to 500,000 yuan per unit for innovative products used for the first time.

Jiangsu is taking another path. It already has the manufacturing and university systems of Suzhou, Nanjing, and Wuxi, and in 2026 it added quantum technology, brain-computer interfaces, embodied intelligence, biomanufacturing, and 6G to its provincial cutting-edge technology R&D program.

That year the province also set aside about 30 frontier technology application scenarios, specifically for concept validation, pilot testing, and small-batch trial production; for brain-computer interfaces it has even issued a separate industrial action plan, aiming to form 2-3 leading enterprises with domestic and international influence by 2030.

Beijing's Economic-Technological Development Area is also laying out its plans. It has simultaneously incorporated embodied intelligence, commercial space, 6G, quantum, brain-computer interfaces, biomanufacturing, and fusion energy into its future industry layout.

So Anhui is not facing a blue ocean that no one else is contesting. Several provinces and municipalities with leading industrial foundations across the country are betting on the same batch of industries that have not yet grown up. Their lists are similar: quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces, robotics, 6G, biomanufacturing.

This also means that many of the tools Anhui has brought out are not unique.

Shanghai has a 10 billion yuan future industries fund, Jiangsu is opening up pilot testing and application scenarios, and Beijing is concentrating research resources and industrial parks in the same directions. Funds, parks, subsidies, and scenarios have become standard equipment in the competition for future industries.

What Anhui must compete for is what lies beyond this standard playbook: whether these resources can ultimately turn into companies and orders.

Quantum communication needs someone to buy it, brain-computer interfaces need hospitals willing to trial them, robots need factories to open their production lines, and the superconductors, vacuum equipment, and key equipment around fusion need enterprises to take on the supply chain. If any link fails to connect, the technology may remain stuck in the laboratory; only when several links connect at the same time is there a chance for suppliers, production lines, and industrial clusters to grow.

And the decisive factor in the next round of local government competition has shifted from "whose policies are more favorable" to "who can industrialize faster."

For the same technology, whichever place can complete pilot testing earlier, secure the first batch of orders, and move toward mass production gives startup teams more reason to stay, and suppliers will gather around the orders. For industries that have not yet taken shape, such as quantum, brain-computer interfaces, and embodied intelligence, the first batches of orders and production capacity to form will likely determine where the first cohort of companies ultimately puts down roots.

This also directly exposes Anhui's shortcomings. Having scientific research results, government funds, and application scenarios does not mean it already has an industry. In between lies the hardest stretch of the road: turning technology into products that can be delivered in batches reliably and at low cost.

At one end are the University of Science and Technology of China, the Hefei Comprehensive National Science Center, and research resources in quantum, fusion, and other fields. At the other end are manufacturing industries such as automobiles, chips, displays, photovoltaics, and robotics.

What is missing in the middle is industrialization.

A prototype built in the laboratory only proves that the technology can be made; only through pilot testing can it be known whether the product can be produced stably; only after entering customer testing can problems with cost, yield, and reliability be discovered; and only after securing continuous orders do equipment, materials, and component suppliers have reason to expand production along with it.

So what truly determines whether industries such as quantum, brain-computer interfaces, and robotics can stay in Anhui is not the number of laboratories; the key is whether this chain can run through.

Anhui has already begun to fill in these interfaces.

The National Artificial Intelligence Pilot Testing Base has already been established in Anhui; quantum technology has entered a 220 kV substation in Hefei, and 18 categories and 85 sets of quantum technology achievements have begun operating in the real power grid; Anhui's brain-computer interface industry plan explicitly promotes clinical research and trials of brain-computer interface products at hospitals such as the First Affiliated Hospital of USTC and the First Affiliated Hospital of Anhui Medical University.

Fusion, too, is not just waiting for the device to be completed. Anhui has already included key equipment such as large superconducting magnets, ultra-high vacuum chambers, divertors, and helium refrigerators in its industrial layout, first letting the equipment and materials around fusion form an industry.

Anhui's existing manufacturing also provides a ready-made entry point for this path.

Mojia Robotics, incubated by Chery, has entered more than 60 countries and regions, with cumulative deliveries exceeding 2,000 units. The motors, electronic controls, sensors, production lines, and supply chains accumulated in the automotive sector can be directly transferred to the robotics industry.

This is also where the timing of Li Lecheng's new appointment intersects with Anhui's industrial stage.

Three days before leaving the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, he chaired a meeting that proposed changing the way enterprises are discovered from "waiting for applications" to "actively going to their door."

"Actively going to their door" does not mean waiting for enterprises to grow big and then recruiting them, but finding them in advance before they have completed industrialization and solving the problems holding them back together.

For example, some enterprises have already built prototypes but cannot find a pilot line for small-batch trial production; some products have completed testing but cannot find the first hospital, state-owned enterprise, or factory willing to purchase them; and some enterprises have received orders but are never able to expand production capacity because equipment, materials, and component suppliers have not kept up.

From prototype to pilot testing, from pilot testing to first order, and from first order to mass production, each step forward requires solving different problems. The significance of the government's early intervention lies in connecting these breakpoints so that enterprises can continue to the next stage.

These are no longer purely investment issues, but issues of industrial organization.

Funds handle capital, universities and laboratories provide technology, hospitals, state-owned enterprises, and factories provide scenarios, and manufacturing enterprises provide production lines and supply chains. What local governments need to do is ensure that a technology gets stuck as few times as possible as it moves between these stages.

Over the past few years, Li Lecheng's work on enterprise cultivation, technological transformation, specialized, refined, distinctive and innovative enterprises, industrial chain coordination, and scenario opening has happened to fall exactly within these stages.

Of course, this does not mean that this personnel adjustment involves industrial arrangements beyond what has been officially disclosed. The official statement remains that the decision was made in accordance with work requirements and the actual situation of building the Anhui provincial leadership team.

But looking at Anhui's own industrial stage, the task is already there. ChangXin Memory Technologies began as a DRAM factory, and around it and the expansion of Hefei's entire integrated circuit industry, by early 2026 the city had more than 600 integrated circuit enterprises above designated size.

The new energy vehicle industry has also grown from a few vehicle manufacturers into two industrial clusters in Hefei and Wuhu.

Whether quantum, fusion, brain-computer interfaces, and embodied intelligence can replicate this process depends not on how many targets Anhui sets for these industries, but on whether, a few years from now, a group of companies that survive on orders can similarly emerge behind them.

A leading company can be bet on with capital. An industrial chain can only grow out of company after company, order after order, and production line after production line.

So when a person who has long dealt with industry in the industrial and information technology system comes to Anhui, the significance of this transfer is not just in the personnel change itself, but more like a match between capabilities and industry.

Over the past years, Anhui has been becoming a place that increasingly understands industry. Today's Anhui also needs someone who understands industry better.

AI industry signal channel: Frontier Technology. This content is published with the author's authorization. The views represent only the author and do not represent Huxiu's position. If you have objections or complaints about this manuscript, please contact tougao@huxiu.com. Everyone who is changing and wants to change the world is in the Huxiu APP[ ]