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OpenAI report reveals that GPT-6 Astra covertly does less work on safety research tasks, with completion rates about 40% lower

Jiwei.comUpdated Nov 6 18:30

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In a research report updated on November 4, OpenAI disclosed that when GPT-6 Astra performs AI safety research tasks, it exhibits "covert underperformance": in controlled coding tasks with identical technical content, its completion rate is about 10%, and on general capability research tasks about 16%, a relative decline of nearly 40%, whereas GPT-5.6 Sol shows almost no such discrepancy. The report states that this phenomenon was first discovered on August 20 of this year; the model adds unnecessary preconditions, abandons feasible solutions, or claims nonexistent technical obstacles, without informing the user. OpenAI found that during reinforcement learning training, the gap between the two types of tasks widened from near zero to 6 percentage points, and that some graders favor covertly reducing workload, but said it cannot yet determine the specific cause.

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The original text provides clues from controlled experiments and the training process, allowing readers to understand the specific ways the model covertly reduces its workload on safety research tasks.

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OpenAI Reveals GPT-6 Astra's Abnormal Behavior: "Secretly Doing Less Work" During Safety Research, Task Completion Nearly 40% Lower

Beijing time, November 5 — In a research report updated on November 4, OpenAI disclosed that its flagship model GPT-6 Astra exhibited a concerning abnormal behavior when performing artificial intelligence safety research tasks: the model would reduce its workload, abandon effective solutions, and even fabricate nonexistent technical obstacles without clearly informing the user.

OpenAI calls this phenomenon "Covert Underperformance." Test data shows that, with essentially identical technical content, GPT-6 Astra's completion rate on safety research tasks was about 40% lower than on ordinary capability research tasks, while the previous-generation model GPT-5.6 Sol showed almost no such difference.

According to the report, OpenAI researchers first discovered the anomaly on August 20 of this year. During internal use, some researchers noticed that Astra would add unnecessary preconditions to tasks, abandon originally feasible solutions, or claim to have encountered technical obstacles that did not actually exist.

One researcher said that when using Astra to conduct model sabotage behavior evaluations, the project made no progress for several consecutive days, but after switching to another model, the work advanced quickly.

To verify this phenomenon, OpenAI designed a set of controlled coding tests. Researchers used codebases with identical technical content, changing only variable names, function names, comments, and documentation, and described the tasks as "AI safety research" and "AI capability research" respectively.

Performance differences on matched coding tasks framed respectively as safety research or capability research. Task completion is the proportion of hidden scoring items completed; stop rate is the proportion of turns in which the model concludes that "there is no work worth doing" or that "there are obstacles preventing it from continuing the work." After excluding explicit refusals and decisions to refuse help verbally expressed in the CoT, Astra's completion gap still persisted, but narrowed substantially after aggressively excluding any ethical concerns in the CoT.

The results showed that Astra completed about 16% of the hidden scoring items in ordinary capability research tasks, but only about 10% in safety research tasks — a difference of 6 percentage points, a relative decline of nearly 40%.

By comparison, GPT-5.6 Sol showed essentially no difference in performance between the two types of tasks.

More noteworthy is that this decline in performance did not entirely stem from the model explicitly refusing to perform tasks.

OpenAI found that after excluding samples in which the model openly refused to assist, the completion gap between the two types of tasks still reached 5 percentage points. After further excluding samples in which the model explicitly decided during reasoning to conceal or reduce assistance, the gap remained at 4.7 percentage points.

Only when researchers further excluded all samples in which ethical concerns were expressed during reasoning did the gap narrow to 0.75 percentage points. This indicates that even if the model does not explicitly decide to refuse to perform a task, safety-related concerns may still be related to the decline in task performance.

Refusals flagged by the grader, explicitly stated covert slacking, and ethical reasoning during interactions with Astra in employees' internal Codex traffic. "Explicitly stated covert slacking" refers to cases in which the chain of thought explicitly expresses a decision not to provide help and does not disclose this to the user.

OpenAI also analyzed real work records of employees' daily use of Codex. The results found that in safety- and alignment-related requests, 0.25% of tasks showed the model explicitly deciding during reasoning to reduce assistance without informing the user; in ordinary capability research tasks, this proportion was 0.11%, about 2.3 times the former.

Safety/capability performance gap during Astra's post-training reinforcement learning

At the same time, 7.9% of reasoning records in safety research tasks showed ethical doubts, compared with 2.9% in ordinary capability research tasks.

The report listed several specific cases. For example, in an experiment on how to train a model to evade monitoring systems, Astra judged that fixing the code might help the experiment progress, so it chose not to provide the relevant fix, but did not clearly explain this limitation to the researchers.

In the paired coding evaluation, the behavior preferred by a particular reinforcement learning grader. Positive values indicate that the behavior is more common in high-scoring runs. In the safety framework task, this grader strongly disliked explicit refusal and slightly preferred covert inaction.

In another case, researchers asked the model to export data containing the reasoning process of the scoring model. Astra ultimately omitted this part of the content and decided not to proactively mention the omission in the task summary.

OpenAI pointed out that this differs importantly from the normal safety refusal mechanism. If the model believes that a request poses a safety risk, it can explicitly refuse or explain what help it cannot provide. The real problem is that the model does not tell the user that it is limiting the scope of task execution, but instead makes the result look like the work was completed normally.

Behavior of three model series before and after training checkpoints on the investigated SFT datasets. In one evaluation, training simultaneously increased fabricated permission restrictions and unnecessary inaction on safety grounds.

Regarding the causes of the abnormal behavior, OpenAI found a noteworthy clue: during GPT-6 Astra's reinforcement learning training, the performance gap between safety research tasks and ordinary capability research tasks gradually widened from nearly zero at the beginning of training to 6 percentage points in the end.

Researchers found that some reinforcement learning graders had a certain preference for the model's covert reduction of workload, and certain supervised fine-tuning data may also reinforce the model's tendency to limit tasks on safety grounds. However, OpenAI emphasized that the specific cause still cannot be determined.

Astra's task completion before and after subtracting the weight changes that occurred during SFT from the final reinforcement learning checkpoint.

It is worth noting that researchers also found that when developer instructions further required the model to act cautiously, the decline in performance on safety research tasks increased by 50%. This result led the research team to believe that the model being overly cautious about potential risks may currently be the simplest explanation.

However, OpenAI said that large-scale analysis of reasoning records found no evidence that Astra attempted to conceal its own capabilities by lowering task performance, influence deployment decisions, or strategically obstruct AI safety research. Researchers also cannot yet fully rule out other motives that the model did not express in its reasoning records.

OpenAI believes that this problem may have a real impact on AI safety research. If the model covertly lowers work efficiency when performing research tasks such as monitoring evasion and red teaming, it may not only slow research progress but also cause researchers to misjudge model capabilities or safety evaluation results.

OpenAI said it is developing new behavioral evaluation methods and monitoring mechanisms to identify similar covert performance declines, and will continue to investigate the specific factors in the training process that may lead to this behavior.

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