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Toyota, Honda, and Nissan sales all plummeted in China, forcing Japanese automakers to retreat to localized R&D

HuxiuUpdated Nov 11 14:36

AI summary

Toyota's China sales from April to September were 684,900 vehicles, down 25.1% year-on-year; Honda China's September sales fell 53.1% year-on-year; Nissan's September sales fell 61.6% year-on-year. In September, the retail penetration rate of new energy passenger vehicles in China reached 67%. Most Japanese pure electric models are converted from fuel vehicles, with weak electric powertrains and infotainment systems, and their advantages of fuel efficiency and durability have been eroded by EVs. Honda has let the Chinese side lead pure electric development, Toyota has integrated its north and south Toyota operations, and Nissan has put a Chinese team in charge and compressed the development cycle from 36 months to under 24 months.

Body · AI translation

[[**Toyota, Honda, and Nissan all saw sharp sales declines in China; NEV penetration has reached 67%, and Japanese brands lag in pure electrics and intelligent features. Their traditional advantages of fuel efficiency and durability are being eroded, forcing them to retreat toward localized R&D and supply chains.**

**Key points**

**1. All three Japanese giants saw sales plunge**

Toyota sold 684,900 vehicles in China from April to September, down 25.1% year-on-year, its lowest for the period since 2017; Honda China fell 53.1% year-on-year in September, and Nissan fell 61.6% year-on-year in September.

**2. Shortcomings in NEVs and intelligent features caused Japanese brands to miss out on growth**

In September, retail penetration of new-energy passenger vehicles reached 67%. Most Japanese pure electric models are converted from fuel vehicles, with weak electric powertrains and infotainment systems; domestic cars already compete on voice control, advanced driver assistance, and OTA updates.

**3. Advantages in fuel efficiency, durability, and high resale value are being eroded by EVs**

EV electricity costs can be as low as one mao per kilometer, while fuel vehicles generally cost five or six mao; EVs require less maintenance, and the appeal of "durable engines" is declining.

**4. Japanese brands are handing more product definition and R&D authority to Chinese partners**

Honda let the Chinese side lead pure electric development and cooperate with local supply chains; Toyota integrated its north and south China operations; Nissan is led by a Chinese team, with development cycles cut from 36 months to under 24 months.

**5. German luxury fuel vehicles also fell below 10,000 units**

September insurance registration data show that mainstream models such as the BMW 3 Series and 5 Series, Mercedes-Benz C-Class and E-Class, Audi A6L, as well as the X3, GLC, and Q5L, all sold fewer than 10,000 units. 2026-10-30 20:05 Are Japanese cars really unsellable now? Phoenix Finance Quick Look

This article is from the WeChat public account: Phoenix Finance, author: Storm Eye

Japanese cars, once so glamorous, are now bidding farewell to their golden age.

Sales data from Toyota, Honda, and Nissan in China have been disclosed one after another, showing sharp declines across the board.

This sustained decline is not the failure of a single model, but a mature playbook that worked in the fuel vehicle market for decades running into an entirely new automotive cycle.

From April to September this year, Toyota's cumulative sales in China were 684,900 vehicles, down 25.1% year-on-year, the lowest for the period since 2017.

Breaking it down, FAW Toyota delivered 61,200 vehicles in September, down 13.8% year-on-year; GAC Toyota sold 54,800 vehicles that month, down 28.37% year-on-year.

Honda's performance was even more dismal.

Honda China's September sales were 25,564 vehicles, down 53.1% year-on-year.

Among them, Dongfeng Honda sold 17,800 vehicles in September, down 35.8% year-on-year; GAC Honda delivered only 4,588 vehicles, a sharp drop of 86.02% year-on-year. In the first nine months of this year, GAC Honda's cumulative sales were less than 97,000 vehicles, down 56.82% year-on-year.

Nissan had the steepest decline among the three Japanese giants.

In September, including commercial vehicles, total sales were 23,658 vehicles, down 61.6% year-on-year. It has now faced sales pressure for six consecutive months, and the decline is still widening.

Many people may wonder why Japanese cars, long known for fuel efficiency and durability, have rapidly lost ground in the domestic market.

The underlying logic of competition in China's auto market has been completely rewritten.

Data show that in September this year, retail penetration of new-energy passenger vehicles in China reached 67%.

This means that for every ten new cars sold in the market, nearly seven are new-energy vehicles. In this largest incremental market, Japanese brands have barely gained a foothold.

In the pure electric segment, Japanese brands' deployment pace is severely lagging. Most of their pure electric products are modified from fuel vehicle platforms, with batteries encroaching on cabin space, inherent layout shortcomings, low integration of electric powertrain systems, and infotainment experiences that fail to keep up with mainstream levels.

The gap in intelligent features has also shifted user preferences.

Currently, domestic models compete on dimensions concentrated in infotainment response speed, continuous voice interaction capability, high-level assisted driving capable of autonomous passage through ramps, and OTA iteration frequency.

These capabilities that users value more and more are precisely the common weaknesses of Japanese models.

The traditional advantages on which Japanese brands relied are being eroded one by one by new-energy vehicles.

Fuel efficiency, durability, and high resale value were once the three cornerstones supporting the reputation of Japanese cars. EV electricity costs per kilometer are as low as one mao, while fuel vehicles generally cost five or six mao, so the fuel-efficiency advantage is gone.

EVs have simple mechanical structures and fewer maintenance items, and the selling point of "durable engines" is steadily losing appeal.

When traditional advantages are no longer overwhelming, the reasons for consumers to choose Japanese brands naturally keep diminishing.

Even German cars, which have long occupied the core of the 300,000-yuan luxury consumption segment, have also reached a turning point.

Image source: Yiche

In previous years during the September peak season, BBA's main models basically secured their places in the 10,000-unit club. But September insurance registration data this year show that retail sales of the BMW 3 Series and 5 Series, Mercedes-Benz C-Class and E-Class, Audi A6L, as well as popular SUVs such as the X3, GLC, and Q5L, all fell below 10,000 units per model.

02

Once they taught people how to build cars; now they have retreated to being brand owners

More than twenty years ago, "the Toyota that never breaks" and Honda, "buy the engine and get the car free," built solid value fortresses in China's fuel vehicle era.

At the market's best, paying a premium to get a car was already commonplace; even after paying the premium, buyers still had to wait months in line for delivery.

For example, the Dongfeng Honda CR-V has commanded a premium since its launch in 2007, at its peak as much as 30,000 yuan. By early 2010, a 15,000-yuan premium on the CR-V was still routine.

But now everything has changed.

Fuel vehicles' inherent advantages are being eroded layer by layer in the face of EVs' specifications, intelligent driving experience, and price offensives. Models that were once in short supply now rely on discounts to move volume.

Pictured is Honda CEO Toshihiro Mibe. Image source: Honda Motor

Honda CEO Toshihiro Mibe visited China at the end of February this year for an inspection tour. After visiting an auto parts supplier's factory in Shanghai, he said, "We simply cannot compete with them."

After the tour ended and he returned home, he summed it up in front of Japanese media and employees: "China has already entered the smartphone era, while we are still using flip phones."

It was this shock that pushed Honda to make bold localization adjustments in China, handing product definition and R&D authority to the Chinese team.

At the Beijing Auto Show in April this year, Honda announced that it would launch in China pure electric models developed under the leadership of its joint venture partners and bearing the Honda badge. At the same time, it opened its posture and cooperated with domestic tech companies and supply chain partners to make up for its shortcomings in intelligentization.

Adjustments at the supply chain level were implemented simultaneously. Honda requires supporting manufacturers to use domestically produced parts as much as possible where conditions permit.

Toyota's changes have been even more frequent.

Image source: Toyota Motor

The slogan "Establish a global presence, be more Chinese" was changed to "with China, for China," and the number of chief engineers responsible for the Chinese market increased from 4 to 7.

Ma Li, executive deputy general manager of Toyota Motor (China), explained externally that product development should be led by people who better understand Chinese consumers.

In early October, FAW, Toyota, and GAC signed a cooperation agreement under which GAC acquired a 50% stake in FAW Toyota. The north and south Toyota systems, which had operated independently for thirty years, will next consolidate their financial statements.

Fuel vehicle territory is constantly being eaten away by domestic new energy vehicles, pure electric models got off to a late start, and the market response to the bZ series has been lukewarm. With the two systems running in parallel for so many years, their products have competed with each other, and their channels and dealers have also fought over customers internally.

This equity integration and unified planning is, in the final analysis, intended to reduce internal friction and seize the last remaining catch-up opportunity in electrification.

Toyota performed surgery on its internal structure, while Nissan took another route.

It narrowed its global key markets from six to three: the United States, Japan, and China.

CEO Espinosa redefined China's role, saying it should be made into Nissan's global innovation and export base, with a short-term goal of exporting 100,000 units a year and a long-term target of 300,000 units.

Dongfeng Nissan also broke through the decision-making wall common in joint ventures, handing product definition, R&D, and pricing decisions to the Chinese team, and compressed the development cycle for new cars from 36 months to within 24 months.

Japanese automakers seem to be slowly letting go of their former airs as the "teachers of carmaking."

Now in China, they are more like brand operators.

The Japanese badge remains on the car body, but the electric drive system, infotainment system, and intelligent driving, and even what a car should be like, are increasingly decided by local teams and the domestic supply chain.

In earlier years, Japanese personnel came over and taught domestic automakers hand by hand how to tune engines reliably. Now the situation is reversed: a mature local supply chain is helping them fill the gaps in electrification.

The golden age that belonged to Japanese cars really seems to be turning the page.

References:

"They Can't Sell Anymore: Japanese Cars Retreat Collectively in China," 21st Century Business Herald Channel: Cars and Mobility. This content comes from the internet and the original link. The views represent only the author and do not represent Huxiu's position. For copyright issues, please contact hezuo@huxiu.com, and we will verify and handle it promptly. Everyone who is changing and wants to change the world is on the Huxiu APP[ ]

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