What Anthropic’s IPO Reveals About How Chinese Large-Model Companies Set Prices
Using Anthropic’s post-IPO valuation fluctuations as a starting point, the article analyzes how the pricing logic for Chinese large-model companies is shifting away from revenue growth and scarcity toward the ability to deliver commercial results. Citing a report, it says the normalized average price of domestic model tokens rose from 6.8 yuan in the second half of 2025 to 13.46 yuan so far this year, and argues that demand for coding and Agents is prompting companies to place greater value on models’ ability to complete production workflows. The author concludes that companies capable of maintaining demand for API calls after raising prices have stronger pricing power.
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The article compares Anthropic’s post-IPO performance with shifts in the valuations of Chinese model companies, offering a framework for assessing valuations through commercial execution and Token pricing power.
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Text | Light Cone Intelligence; Author | Wei Linhua; Editor | Liu Junhong
At 11:48 a.m. Eastern Time on November 19, Anthropic (ticker: ANT) officially began trading on Nasdaq, carrying the halo of “the largest IPO in human history.”
Compared with Anthropic’s finalized offering price of $83, the stock opened sharply higher at $111.50, a surge of 34.3%, and climbed as high as $115.10 intraday. On a fully diluted basis, Anthropic’s valuation peaked at $2.02 trillion, overtaking SpaceX, which went public in June this year.
However, the post-opening euphoria lasted less than half an hour. By the close, Anthropic’s market capitalization had been on a roller-coaster ride.
Anthropic’s shares began plunging in the afternoon, reaching an intraday low of $92.72 before closing at $97.17. Although that still represented a 17.07% gain from the $83 offering price, Anthropic had shed roughly $324.4 billion in market value from its intraday high by the close. On a fully diluted basis, the company’s valuation fell from $2 trillion to around $1.76 trillion.
As the bell rang across the Pacific, nearly every large-model founder, investor, and secondary-market analyst in China’s AI sector was staying up late watching the market. They were not focused on the rise and fall of Anthropic alone, but searching for an answer: Now that the “anchor” for global AI valuations has dropped into the deep waters of the public market, how exactly should Chinese AI models be priced next?
After all, in the run-up to the bell-ringing ceremony, Anthropic’s valuation had already been cut repeatedly—from the initial $2 trillion valuation assigned by investment institutions, to the markdown during Anthropic’s Q3 roadshow, and then amid factors such as the U.S. midterm elections and Nvidia’s sudden leadership change.
For Anthropic, pressing ahead with an IPO at this juncture was more like a stress test for the entire AI industry.
Anthropic’s listing was never a story about whether it was “too expensive.” It was a story about how its value should be calculated.
And the new yardstick Wall Street used to scrutinize Anthropic today will be applied, unchanged, to every Chinese large-model company.
Anthropic’s valuation rose, but the excess had already been squeezed out
As a “bellwether” for large-model companies worldwide, Anthropic’s 17% share-price gain was perfectly normal.
Investor appetite remained strong. According to information reported by Bloomberg, subscription orders amounted to roughly six to seven times the number of shares available, with demand driven primarily by large indications of interest from institutional investors.
As a result, Anthropic not only had the confidence to raise its price but also planned to capitalize on the favorable market conditions and build up more funding.
By November 18, Anthropic had ultimately raised its share price from the initial range of $70–$78 to $83. It also increased the number of shares offered by 19%, from the originally planned 825 million to 980 million, raising nearly $20 billion in additional cash.
With demand for the shares outstripping supply, Anthropic also had a host of computing-power suppliers backing it:
Just before the listing, a group of technology giants that could be described as a “global computing-power all-star team”—including Nvidia, Google, Microsoft, AMD, Broadcom, Micron, and partners of TSMC—collectively agreed to subscribe for $26 billion worth of Anthropic shares. Google and Nvidia made the largest commitments, each putting up $10 billion.
By stepping forward, these computing-power suppliers and cloud providers effectively bound themselves tightly to Anthropic while locking in future computing-power orders in advance.
The $26 billion investment looked more like a “strategic lock-in fee” paid by the giants. As long as Anthropic used the money to continue its aggressive expansion and train its next-generation models, the funds would eventually turn into orders and flow back through procurement contracts to Nvidia’s chips, Broadcom’s servers, and the data centers of major cloud providers.
Who were Anthropic’s largest shareholders? The answer was Amazon and Google. According to data disclosed by Anthropic, Amazon held a total stake of 14.7%, followed closely by Google with 13.7%.
Although the company’s market capitalization ultimately settled at around $1.76 trillion, viewed over a longer timeline, the seeds of today’s fluctuations in Anthropic’s market value had actually been planted three months before the listing.
Back in August, the market was still enthusiastically calculating a $2 trillion valuation for Anthropic. The pricing logic at the time was simple and blunt, mirroring the fervor for large models in China’s primary market: As long as the models kept evolving and revenue growth continued to soar, there was no ceiling on the company’s potential valuation.
But reality poured cold water on those expectations. Beginning in October, Anthropic experienced several “moments” of declining valuation:
First, revenue growth fell short of expectations, prompting investment institutions to reassess its value. During its October roadshow, Anthropic disclosed that quarter-over-quarter revenue growth had fallen from 144% in Q2 to 47% in Q3. Investment institutions consequently moved first to squeeze out some of the excess, revising the valuation down to $1.5 trillion.
That adjustment still reflected doubts about Anthropic itself. The subsequent decline in the company’s valuation was driven more by broader concerns about the outlook for the AI industry.
After the U.S. midterm elections, pessimism over tighter regulation of data centers triggered another bloodbath for U.S. AI stocks. On November 6, the Nasdaq fell 5.52%, while the Philadelphia Semiconductor Index plunged about 12%.
In the process, Anthropic’s market capitalization declined, wiping out its premium based on imagined potential.
Moreover, the structure of tech giants taking sides and binding themselves to computing power will also make investors cautious. After all, amid those impressive financings and soaring revenues on paper, how much actually comes from organic demand in the real market, and how much is the product of a circular game in which the giants “invest money with the left hand and sell computing power with the right”?
With total committed spending under purchase commitments and lease agreements reaching as high as $90.09 billion, Jensen Huang abruptly resigned after leading Nvidia for 33 years. Together with the new signals released after CFO Colette Kress succeeded him as CEO, this removed one of the most crucial pillars supporting the AI computing-power financing game.
During Nvidia’s earnings call, Kress publicly laid out the new rules: Nvidia will scrutinize companies receiving financing support with extreme rigor going forward. Data center guarantees will take effect only after facilities have actually been completed and are ready for use, and no guarantees whatsoever will be provided during construction. If construction of a data center is delayed, Nvidia’s guarantee will cease to exist.
Over the past two years, Nvidia has not merely sold the shovels; it has also served as the “super-guarantor” for the entire buildout of AI infrastructure. By the end of October this year, Nvidia’s exposure from external financing guarantees for AI infrastructure had snowballed to $11.8 billion.
Previously, the market was willing to assign high valuations to large-model giants such as Anthropic that were deeply tied to computing power, largely because it assumed Nvidia stood behind them and would shoulder the burden if anything went wrong. Now, the big brother has suddenly changed, and the newcomer’s first move was to take back the blank check for unlimited bailouts. It is difficult for the market not to worry.
With that credit backing no longer effective, everyone must reassess whether Anthropic’s future growth expectations can be realized—and to what extent.
The same is true in the Chinese market.
Over the past two years, many Chinese large-model companies have relied on binding themselves to major tech companies’ cloud resources and securing strategic investment to support lofty valuations. But Anthropic’s experience has already previewed the ending. Once these companies enter the public market, investors will sooner or later separate the distortion created by major tech companies’ subsidies from actual commercialization performance and assess each on its own.
Anthropic’s listing has sent a signal to Chinese large-model companies: the era when a high-growth story along a single dimension could sweep the entire secondary market is over.
Watching Anthropic fall from the heights of a $2 trillion valuation back to the reality of $1.5 trillion inevitably raises concerns: Chinese large-model companies have likewise used revenue growth to drive up their valuations, so what fate awaits them next?
Valuations Squeezed, Demand Booming: How Should Chinese Large-Model Companies Be Priced?
To understand the valuations of Chinese large-model companies, one must begin with the changes surrounding Anthropic, because it is not Anthropic that has changed, but the yardstick the capital markets use for pricing.
In fact, compared with Wall Street, which has only now begun to “squeeze the excess” out of Anthropic, the market capitalizations of Chinese large-model companies had already moved to more rational levels.
Take the currently listed Zhipu and MiniMax, for example. Even before Anthropic rang the opening bell, the two companies had already demonstrated the process of “squeezing excess out of valuations” for the entire industry.
When Zhipu and MiniMax listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January this year, they enjoyed unrivaled acclaim, with Zhipu even setting a record by reaching a market capitalization of RMB 1 trillion. Why were they so outrageously expensive at the time? It came down to two things: scarce supply and a narrative of soaring ARR.
When MiniMax listed, only about 17.07 million of its shares were publicly tradable in Hong Kong, accounting for less than 6% of its total share capital. Yet it attracted a frenzy of subscriptions from 420,000 investors and was oversubscribed by as much as 1,837.17 times. Zhipu likewise set an oversubscription record of 1,159.46 times.
But just a few months later, looking at the companies’ current valuations, both have lost more than 80% of their market capitalization from their peaks. Business revenue is still soaring, but as the expiration of lockup periods approaches, the scarcity premium on their publicly tradable shares has vanished in an instant.
Zhipu’s market capitalization
More worrying are the large-model companies that remain at the table but have yet to go public—the chill in the secondary market is inevitably seeping back into the primary market.
OpenAI, the leading player overseas, has also recently been pressing ahead with a new financing round to replenish its war chest before Anthropic’s listing. OpenAI had originally aimed to raise $30 billion at a valuation of $1.4 trillion, but investors clearly did not have that large an appetite.
Ultimately, the valuation for this financing round fell from $1.4 trillion to $1.25 trillion, directly erasing $150 billion—a decline of 10.7%—while the initial proceeds also shrank to around $15 billion. Under the scrutiny of capital, OpenAI could not avoid a single bit of the discount it deserved.
If even OpenAI must voluntarily bow its head and accept a discount, then turning back to China, how much room remains for currently unlisted Chinese large-model companies to raise their valuations?
Once the excess has been squeezed out, the value of Chinese large-model companies will no longer depend on grand promises; it must instead be tied to their genuine ability to commercialize and generate revenue.
Over the past two years, China’s AI sector has been deeply anxious about commercializing large models: B2B MaaS revenue has been limited, while the consumer market has yet to produce a truly breakout product.
By 2026, as Coding took off and demand for Agents materialized, Token prices began to rise.
According to the Large-Model Token Service Performance Monitoring Report (2026) released by the China Academy of Information and Communications Technology, the normalized average price in China was RMB 6.8 in the second half of 2025, compared with RMB 13.46 since the beginning of this year, an increase of nearly 100%. Overseas prices nevertheless remain higher than domestic ones, with typical models released since 2026 averaging a normalized price of approximately RMB 117.8.
Why are people still rushing to use them despite the price increases? Because once large models truly enter complex production processes such as software development and enterprise-grade Agents, customers no longer want cheap chat toys; they want productivity tools that can directly perform human work. As long as a model is smart enough and can reliably complete workflows, companies are willing to pay real money for it.
During Nvidia’s earnings call, the interim CEO disclosed a new set of data: rental prices for B300 chips based on the new Blackwell architecture have surged by more than 60% from their launch levels. Even older cards based on the previous-generation Hopper architecture are renewing under multiyear contracts at prices as high as twice their original rates. Whether operated by hyperscale cloud providers or emerging computing-power clouds, all available computing capacity is running at full load.
Chinese computing power also remains in short supply. On November 18, Alibaba CEO Eddie Wu said during an earnings call that as production capacity ramps up, domestically produced computing power will continue to account for a larger share of total computing power and become the main engine supporting cloud-revenue growth.
Next, as supply-chain constraints persist and major tech companies’ race for chips intensifies, computing accelerator cards on the market will only become scarcer in 2027. When continuously growing application demand collides with an even tighter supply of computing power, Token prices will most likely continue to rise.
Whether it is the game involving publicly tradable shares in Hong Kong or valuation leaps in the primary market, whenever valuations run ahead of commercial results, the secondary market will sooner or later squeeze out the excess in the most brutal way possible.
Players that remain at the table must use their “pricing power” over Token to prove that they are irreplaceable. The fact that Token prices rose in 2026 while usage volumes surged has already shown Chinese large-model companies a path to survival—whoever can make companies remain dependent on its API even after prices rise will have secured genuine pricing power.
What Anthropic has sounded is the closing bell for the old pricing era. As the tide recedes, large-model companies that have been swimming naked must take a fresh, clear look at what they are actually worth.
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