Embodied intelligence financing cools starting in September, with over 20 robotics companies bankrupt or shut down within 19 months
Financing in the embodied intelligence industry has cooled markedly since September; the first half of October saw only 19 deals worth 4.934 billion yuan, far below August's 91 deals worth 31.323 billion yuan, with capital concentrating further among the leaders. The article counts more than 20 robotics companies that went bankrupt, dissolved, liquidated, or shut down business lines during the 19 months from February 2025 to September 2026; Nanjing Wujing Dynamics halted work and owed wages just eight months after its founding. Demand is likewise weak: among winning bids in the first half of the year, education and research accounted for 55.5% and government platforms 20.6%; in Unitree's humanoid robot revenue for the first three quarters, research and education accounted for 73.6%, while scenarios such as intelligent manufacturing accounted for only 2.64%.
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Using data on financing, bankruptcies, and bid wins, the article traces embodied intelligence's transition from a capital high to a squeeze on excess.
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[[**Embodied AI financing has cooled markedly since September, with capital concentrating in the leaders while mid-tier players contract and bankruptcies and unpaid wages increase; robots have yet to enter real production scenarios at scale, and the industry has entered a period of squeezing out excess and weathering the winter.**
**Key points**
**1. Financing has cooled and is concentrating in the leaders**
In the first half of October there were 19 deals worth 4.934 billion yuan, versus 91 deals worth 31.323 billion yuan in August; the top 20 companies raised about 33 billion yuan, accounting for over 70%, while mid-tier players lowered expectations and old shares traded at a discount.
**2. Startups have begun suspending operations and missing payroll**
Nanjing Wujing Dongli suspended operations and missed payroll just eight months after founding; Yinghe Robotics convened a creditors' meeting, Shenlan Robotics had its bankruptcy liquidation accepted, and more than 20 robotics companies went bankrupt or shut down within 19 months.
**3. Insufficient real demand is the main cause**
Among winning bids in the first half of the year, education and research accounted for 55.5% and government platforms 20.6%; in Unitree's first three quarters, humanoid robot revenue from research and education accounted for 73.6%, while intelligent manufacturing and other areas accounted for only 2.64%, and robots still lack data.
**4. Companies are contracting or stockpiling cash to survive the winter**
Layoffs, cutting businesses, pay cuts, hiring freezes and dumping of old shares coexist; some companies are also raising funds and making acquisitions while preserving cash. Wang Tianmiao advises focusing on cash flow and surviving first.
**5. The secondary market is revaluing primary-market valuations**
Mech-Mind broke issue price on its first day, Unitree's market value has fallen back, and UBTech's largest drawdown was about 87%; the IPO window is reported to be tightening, and the secondary market is revaluing primary-market valuations. 2026-10-30 10:49 Embodied robots, winter is coming — Chaoyong AI Quick Overview
In mid-October Shanghai, the osmanthus is in full bloom, and there is already a hint of chill in the warm autumn sun.
This is not an isolated case.
Some embodied AI companies are also consciously preparing for winter: laying off staff, contracting businesses, pausing expansion, while striving for one last round of financing before winter. Big money is better; if they cannot get big money, they take whatever they can get. The reasoning is consistent: next year's money may not be as plentiful or as hot as this year's.
Some companies did not make it to the next round of money.
Nanjing Wujing Dongli was reported to have suspended operations and missed payroll eight months after founding, with both employees and the CEO saying they could not reach the actual controller; Shenzhen Yinghe Robotics held its first creditors' meeting on October 19; Shanghai Shenlan Robotics had its bankruptcy liquidation accepted by a court in May...
IT Juzi data shows that in the first half of 2026, the embodied AI industry raised 93.5 billion yuan across 322 deals, with the number of financing events up 137% year on year, and the number of unicorns valued at over 10 billion yuan rising from 3 to at least 22.
Another tally based on publicly disclosed amounts recorded 288 financings involving 226 companies, with a disclosed total of over 46 billion yuan; the top 20 companies together raised about 33 billion yuan, accounting for more than 70%, while the remaining 200-plus companies shared about 12.4 billion yuan.
Image source: IT Juzi
Large financings came one after another.
In March, Galaxy General completed a 2.5 billion yuan financing led by the National Artificial Intelligence Industry Investment Fund; Qianxun Intelligence completed four consecutive rounds totaling nearly 5 billion yuan, with its valuation reaching 20 billion yuan; Zhipingfang's valuation rose from 10 billion to 20 billion yuan in four months; in April, Tashi Zhihang raised $455 million in a single round, setting an industry record at the time; in June, the Global Embodied AI Track monthly financing figure compiled by the Humanoid Robot Scenario Application Alliance reached 31.5 billion yuan.
New entrants are also getting younger.
Huang Yi, born in 2004, founded RoboParty in 2025 and had raised nearly 500 million yuan by July 2026; Yuan Che Taichu, founded by Tsinghua doctoral student Qin Shentao, raised over 500 million yuan within five months of operation; Ni Juzhen, founded by Chen Boyuan, a Peking University Yuanpei graduate, raised over $100 million in its seed++ round at a valuation of over 5 billion yuan.
The peak of the heat was August 19.
Unitree Technology listed on the STAR Market at an issue price of 150.80 yuan, opened at 1,100 yuan, up 629.44% from the issue price, and its market value once reached 444.9 billion yuan. The 0.0181% winning rate corresponded to a maximum paper gain of about 475,000 yuan per winning lot, and its issue price-to-earnings ratio of 219.23 times was also far above the 38.56 times static P/E of the general equipment manufacturing industry to which it belongs. One investor's logic was very straightforward: "Don't agonize over valuation, just get the money."
The turning point was first voiced by those who had invested.
Wang Huadong, managing partner of Matrix Partners China, was the sole lead investor in Unitree's 2021 B1 round. In the video podcast "Xiangtan," he recalled walking into a robotics lab in Silicon Valley in March 2024, where eight Unitree robots were still usable while products from other brands were basically broken. He believes that among Chinese companies that can achieve absolute global leadership in a field, DJI is one and Unitree is another.
But in the same interview, he also offered two judgments: angel investments of hundreds of millions of yuan and valuations of billions of yuan at every turn represent an intensity unprecedented in Chinese business history, including the craziest period of the mobile internet; the concentrated listing of leading companies is very likely the peak of this cycle.
Forty days later, the second milestone arrived.
On September 28, AMD announced it had signed a definitive agreement to acquire World Labs, the world model company founded by Fei-Fei Li, in an all-stock deal valued at about $8.2 billion; the transaction still requires regulatory approval and is expected to be completed by the end of 2026; after closing, Fei-Fei Li will serve as AMD executive vice president and chief scientist; World Labs' public valuation after its February financing was about $5 billion to $5.4 billion, representing a rise of about 50% to 60% over seven months compared with the deal price.
One embodied-AI sector investor put it more bluntly: after more than two years in operation, the company had produced only a demo, and its world-model roadmap was still unclear; the deal looked more like cashing out and getting ashore.
To some domestic embodied-AI founders, the world model field seemed to have suddenly "lost its standard-bearer," and the reaction was more panic than envy.
On one side, a domestic humanoid robot company set an astonishing first-day IPO price; on the other, a star scientist chose to sell his company at a high point.
The two milestones came forty days apart, and together they remind the market: at the hottest moment, someone is already arranging an exit.
How the money cooled
The money hit the brakes in September.
In early September, The Information reported, citing people familiar with the matter, that regulators had used informal "window guidance" to slow the listing process for some humanoid robot companies; Reuters followed up, noting that regulators' concerns included excessively high valuations and whether revenue tied to government-supported projects reflected real market demand. The CSRC did not respond to a request for comment.
On September 21, because the company and its sponsor voluntarily withdrew the application, the Shanghai Stock Exchange terminated the STAR Market listing review of Huandong Technology. The company, which focuses on high-precision reducers for robot joints, became the first robot IPO project on the STAR Market this year to have its review terminated. In Hong Kong, as of mid-August, more than 50 embodied intelligence companies had filed but not yet listed.
On October 15, IT Juzi data further showed that in the first half of October, the sector saw 19 financing deals totaling 4.934 billion yuan, compared with 91 deals and 31.323 billion yuan in August. October was counted for only half a month and spanned the National Day holiday; even if the first-half amount is simply annualized into a full month, it is still less than one-third of August's.
The real temperature may be lower than the disclosed data.
Most of the financings now announced are deals that were already settled months ago. As one industry insider put it: "Real changes in the market often take time to show up in the data."
The money has not left the sector; it has concentrated further in the leaders.
A Zhongtai Securities report dated October 13 showed that in the first half of the year, embodied intelligence financing totaled about 43.8 billion yuan, of which companies with embodied brains as their core business received 22.253 billion yuan and full-machine body companies received 5.6 billion yuan, with the former nearly four times the latter.
The leaders are still grabbing money.
According to Caijing, Zhiyuan launched a new round of 1 billion to 1.5 billion yuan in financing at a valuation of about 50 billion yuan; as of the report, Zhiyuan had not responded. Stardust Intelligence announced on the same day that it had completed a 1 billion yuan B+ round, its fourth round in half a year; XPeng's robotics business completed its first round of more than $900 million in August.
Mid-tier players are starting to lower expectations.
The old-share market is even more direct: according to a 36Kr report, old shares have already been offered at a valuation of 12 billion yuan, but few investors are willing to participate in a capital increase at a valuation of 22 billion yuan.
Concentration is inherently the underlying nature of this business. R&D costs are measured in hundreds of millions of yuan, and talent, supply chain, scenarios and capital are all indispensable; only a small number of teams are destined to enter.
When times are hot, mid-tier players can still get a share; once money tightens, the sector retreats faster into a game for the few.
The secondary market is also revaluing primary-market prices.
Mech-Mind listed on September 1 at an issue price of HK$101.7, broke below its issue price on the first day, and later fell as low as HK$78.05, about 23% below the issue price. Unitree's market value, after falling from its first-day high, rebounded to about 200.6 billion yuan on October 19, still more than 240 billion yuan below its peak. UBTech's share price once fell from a high of HK$328 to a low of HK$40.8, a maximum drawdown of about 87%.
Image source: Fin$cope
For a group of companies still raising money at a valuation of 20 billion yuan, an IPO may no longer mean an honorable exit; it may also mean repricing.
Huang Lichong, president of Huisheng International Capital, put it bluntly: a robot company obtaining a post-money valuation of 50 billion yuan does not mean the secondary market is willing to take over at the same market value.
The first to fall
Before winter arrived, some were already frostbitten. The latest case did not even survive this summer.
Nanjing Wujing Dynamics was founded only on February 11 this year, making industrial-grade quadruped robots and selling robot dogs to power, petrochemical, and energy mining sectors. In June, the company disclosed that just four months after its founding it had signed framework orders worth nearly 500 million yuan with several central state-owned enterprises, plus nearly 500 million yuan in local reserve orders, and announced that 110 million yuan in financing had been secured.
Its core team of about 20 people mostly has backgrounds at Tsinghua, Zhejiang University, and Shanghai Jiao Tong University, with some members from Zhijiang Lab, Zhiyuan Innovation, and Stardust Era. In September, it released the Panshi P25-Ex explosion-proof wheel-legged robot, claiming it reached IIC T6 explosion-proof rating; another quadruped robot for substation inspection was originally scheduled for delivery in October.
On October 23, employees told the media that the company began withholding wages in August, stopped contributing to the housing provident fund in September, and stopped paying social insurance in October; three to four dozen employees had been owed nearly 8 million yuan in total, the company had halted work, and some employees had applied for labor arbitration. Employees and CEO Yuan Haihui both said they could not reach the actual controller, Cui Xiaofei; reporters called Cui Xiaofei multiple times but could not get through.
The orders and financing the company previously disclosed now all need further verification.
Of the nearly 1 billion yuan in orders, half were framework orders and half were local reserve orders, and there are still multiple steps before formal procurement, delivery, and payment collection. The actual receipt and use of the 110 million yuan in financing also cannot be confirmed from public information alone.
A head of an embodied-AI company told Pencil Road that there is a long distance between signing an order and actual procurement and delivery. "If you lack a sense of crisis about costs and commercial operations, even hundreds of millions of yuan in financing can be burned through quickly."
The ones that fell earlier were the previous batch of star companies.
On October 19, the Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court convened the first creditors' meeting for Yinghe Robotics. The company was founded in March 2020, incubated by He Jianfeng, son of Midea founder He Xiangjian, and ByteDance Strategic Investment, Meituan Strategic Investment, GSR Ventures, and Panda Capital all appear on its shareholder list. It reached a valuation of $500 million in ten months and raised more than 600 million yuan in cumulative financing.
At its peak, Yinghe ran five business lines simultaneously.
In March 2021, it signed an agreement with Foshan Shunde, planning to invest 10 billion yuan to build an R&D and industrial base, with less than a month from initial talks to signing.
The key piece that crushed it was delivery and payment collection.
For the Foshan Lighting bulb smart manufacturing workshop project it undertook in 2021, final acceptance was still not passed two years past the deadline, and the court of final appeal ordered Yinghe to return 26.904 million yuan and dismantle the equipment at its own expense. The equipment under its name was judicially auctioned, with an appraised value of about 49.74 million yuan; it was put up for auction twice, in April and May this year, and both auctions failed.
The last operating data it left behind was: 2025 revenue of 4.33 million yuan and a net loss of 67 million yuan. In June this year, Li Lun, founding partner of shareholder Panda Capital, posted a video questioning: the company had no stable cash flow, some core executives had after-tax annual salaries exceeding 3 million yuan, and the renovation of a 2,600-square-meter office cost 28 million yuan.
Yinghe is not an isolated case.
Shenlan Robotics had its bankruptcy liquidation accepted by a Shanghai court in May; its parent company Shenlan Technology once claimed a valuation of 14 billion yuan. The five batches of employee claims published by the court total more than 23 million yuan, involving 102 people, and include unpaid wages, economic compensation, and housing provident fund, among other items, so they cannot simply all be classified as unpaid wages.
Zhicheng Dynamics received investment from Li Zexiang's Qingshuiwan Fund and Ecovacs; its pool-cleaning robots had cumulative sales of nearly 100 million yuan, yet it fell into a cash flow crisis due to difficulties in collecting receivables and other reasons. In September, it was petitioned for bankruptcy reorganization by creditors and subsequently entered pre-reorganization proceedings; the company said at the time that it was still operating normally. This is a different legal status from having been ruled into bankruptcy liquidation.
CloudMinds Robotics once had a valuation exceeding 20 billion yuan and in 2025 was ruled to have its bankruptcy liquidation accepted; Silicon Valley's K-Scale Labs disbanded after its account balance fell to about $400,000, issuing refunds and open-sourcing its technology; Longhui Medical, Chuangze Intelligent, Lesheng Robotics, Guangdong Hongda Xingye Robotics, and other companies also entered bankruptcy proceedings of varying degrees this year...
Based on public reports and court announcements, TMTPost statistics show that in the 19 months from February 2025 to September 2026, more than 20 robotics companies underwent bankruptcy, dissolution, liquidation, or shutdown of business lines, covering at least 11 tracks.
It should be emphasized that bankruptcy review, pre-reorganization, bankruptcy liquidation, and voluntary dissolution are not equivalent, but together they point to one thing: after the financing window tightened, delivery, payment collection, and cash flow began to face the same stress test.
Liu Qigui, a professor at the Business School of Ningbo University, believes this is not the accidental death of a particular company but the regular clearing of an investment cycle. A person close to Yinghe's Series A financing recalled that the company's valuation had already reached $500 million before its product was launched. "Crowding in does not necessarily mean believing how big the market is; it means believing someone will take over later."
Why the pessimism: robots still cannot get onto the field
Why did these companies fail?
On the surface, the money ran out; looking deeper, there is only one common internal cause: capital has already entered on a large scale, but robots have not yet entered real production scenarios on a large scale.
This awkward fact was briefly brought to the table by a debate in September, when Mech-Mind founder Shao Tianlan fired off consecutive posts on WeChat Moments. The controversy pushed an industry problem to the fore: when robots have not yet formed sufficient end demand, how much of the revenue provided by data collection centers, joint ventures, and industrial funds can actually be converted into sustainable market revenue?
According to Caijing, some data collectors have participated in transactions where contracts were signed but physical delivery was not completed; some local investment promotion officials even described certain data collection projects as a "new type of Ponzi scheme."
These industry phenomena need to be verified item by item, and certainly cannot be directly equated with the illegal facts of any one company.
In a talk on Zhao Hejuan Talk last December, Li Fei-Fei said something very calm: robotics research is still in its early stages, and robots really lack data. The automotive industry has run for decades and accumulated massive amounts of real driving data; robots lack mature commercial applications in everyday scenarios, making it difficult to collect valid data at scale. If this problem is not solved, research will find it hard to move beyond the early stage.
The demand structure provides another set of evidence.
According to statistics from the Humanoid Robot Scenario Application Alliance, in the first half of 2026, more than 218 publicly disclosed embodied intelligence and humanoid robot bid-winning projects in China had contract amounts exceeding 1.723 billion yuan; educational and research institutions accounted for 55.5%, government and public platforms 20.6%, and industrial and technology enterprises 21.1%.
Image source: Humanoid Robot Scenario Application Alliance
Unitree's prospectus and inquiry response show that in the first three quarters of 2025, scientific research and education accounted for 73.6% of its humanoid robot revenue, commercial consumption 17.39%, and industry applications 9.01%; revenue actually used in scenarios such as smart manufacturing and smart inspection was 15.702 million yuan, accounting for 2.64% of total humanoid robot revenue.
The two sets of data correspond to different statistical scopes and cannot be spliced together, but they point in a similar direction: at this stage, the main buyers of robots are still not large-scale production lines.
Practitioners' feelings are colder than the data.
The question Shi Xiaoxin, the No. 1 product leader for XPeng Robotics, asked before resigning has been repeatedly quoted across the industry: "Once 10,000 robots are built, where do you put them?" Wang Peng, who works on embodied pretraining, judges that domestic embodied intelligence has entered a technology plateau period, with no new paradigm-level breakthrough in sight in the short term. His advice is to first push forward deployment and accumulate scenario data, preserving resilience for the next shock from large models.
Wang Xingxing's shifting wording was recorded by Chaoyong AI in "Wang Xingxing's Remarks Today Reveal That Embodied Intelligence Faces Two Hard Years": in August 2025, he said the ChatGPT moment for embodied intelligence would come "if things go smoothly, in one or two years, or two or three years"; on August 20, 2026, the second day after listing, it became "two to three years at the fastest, five to ten years at the slowest"; on October 12 at the Industrial Fair, he said "possibly even within one or two years at the fastest"; on October 22 at the World Physical AI Conference, he returned to "one to two years, or two to three years," and said early signs of a breakthrough had already appeared.
The timeline keeps changing with progress in large models, but the bottleneck has not disappeared.
He laid out the sticking point clearly: for embodied intelligence to pass the ChatGPT moment, the core challenge is aligning the input and output of AI models with real robots, "large models can plan and navigate, but they have not solved the problems that arise after physical contact." On the same day he also admitted that the biggest mistake of the past decade or so was not trusting AI enough.
Postures for Getting Through the Winter
Contraction is the most common posture.
According to Chaoyong AI, a few leading companies have begun cutting salaries and freezing hiring, shifting headcount from expansion to defense, and word has even begun circulating in the market of "star companies' old shares being dumped at half price," while more companies are cutting business lines and shrinking teams, reserving limited cash for core directions;
Unitree's cost control extends down to the reimbursement level, and "Unitree employees say reimbursements over 100 yuan require Wang Xingxing's approval" became a trending topic.
At WAIC in July, Beihang University professor Wang Tianmiao's advice to entrepreneurs was already very specific: let go of attachment to valuations, narrow the battlefield, take small quick steps, focus on cash flow, and survive first.
Another posture is stockpiling provisions.
In June this year, Yuanli Lingji completed a new round of financing, with investors including large-model companies such as Alibaba, Zhipu, SenseTime, and StepFun; in the same month, it merged through an equity acquisition with Atomix, a logistics robotics company that Tang Wenbin brought out of the Megvii system; Atomix's four-way pallet shuttles rank second in global sales, with customers including Uniqlo, Mixue Bingcheng, and CATL, and annual revenue of nearly 1 billion yuan.
Co-founder Fan Haoqiang said in an interview in May this year: "There is no AI bubble, but there is an OpenAI bubble."
He believes the industry will go through three rounds of screening, and the first threshold is capital and valuation. Expressing confidence in the technology while preparing cash and scenarios in advance is not contradictory. Tang Wenbin and Fan Haoqiang both came from Megvii, have seen the previous AI retreat, and know that confidence cannot replace cash flow.
Looking further out, the cold is synchronized.
On October 15, in McGregor, Texas, at the SpaceX launch event, the second-generation Roadster completed a ramp run, an aerial flip, and a landing; the driver's-side door opened, and sitting in it was Optimus. It did not drive; the entire vehicle stunt was performed remotely by preset programs, and Optimus was only part of the demonstration. In his opening remarks, Musk said real people needed to be present to prove that what happened next was not AI or CGI.
Optimus's mass production has also failed to catch up with the original timeline.
The deployment target of 5,000 units set in 2025 saw actual output stall in the hundreds; the production line converted at the Fremont factory will not begin external sales until the second half of 2027 at the earliest.
OpenAI has confirmed it is advancing a humanoid robot project, with R&D focused on robot intelligence systems. Altman expects to launch a demonstration prototype in 2027, but real progress toward public practical application will still take years.
At the same time, hardware supply capacity is improving.
Along Shenzhen Nanshan's "Robot Valley," about 80% of components can be sourced nearby. Eight AgiBot Genie G2 units ran on the line at Longcheer's Nanchang factory for six days, 10 hours a day, with full livestreaming, completing 64,828 operations, and the company officially disclosed a success rate of 99.99%. Building the robot body can still generate profit, but the profit model is increasingly close to manufacturing: cost, capacity, yield, and delivery can all be calculated item by item.
What is truly expensive and scarce is still the "brain" that can work across scenarios. It does not have an equally mature supply chain, nor a unified, verifiable basis for pricing.
In the price of the brain, expectation still outweighs fact.
But this distance is longer than many people initially imagined.
From the influx of capital to robots replacing labor at scale, there are several years in between. These years are the winter the industry must cross.
This is the real meaning of the current scramble for money and contraction: it is not that the industry is finished, but that the industry has begun to squeeze out the water.
The money has not left robotics either; it has only changed its evaluation method.
Chaoyong AI reported in "Embodied Money Begins to Go 'Up to the Sky and Out to Sea'" that after Zhu Xiaohu exited humanoid robot companies in batches, he turned to investing in underwater robots; Xianyin Future, founded just over a year ago and having completed three financing rounds in four months, is in the business of repairing satellites in space and refueling satellites with propellant.
Capital preferences are changing: from long-term narratives whose returns are hard to calculate, toward scenarios with clearer customers, costs, and collections.
Of course, not everyone can endure it; a large number of companies will die, perhaps even most of them.
Wang Huadong has pointed to two historical patterns: after a representative company goes public, within at most a year, the industry begins to run into problems; he also drew an analogy with the EV industry—the combined market value of all EV startups after going public is lower than the total money raised across the industry, so industry investors as a whole are losing money.
Whether these two patterns will repeat in embodied intelligence is the most important question to watch over the next year.
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology's humanoid robot full-lifecycle platform has already assigned codes to more than 28,000 robots, covering R&D, production, market access, sales, use, maintenance, scrapping, and recycling. It means full-lifecycle management has begun to be implemented, but it still cannot be concluded from this that an "exit mechanism" for enterprises has been established.
Meanwhile, Unitree's first financial report after going public has also been released: net profit attributable to shareholders for the first three quarters was 387 million yuan, a year-on-year surge of 270.54%, which became the main theme of publicity. But what the market cannot ignore is that the company's Q3 net profit was 113 million yuan, while Q2 net profit was 224 million yuan—a quarter-on-quarter decline of 49%. Revenue maintained high growth, but short-term profit fell sharply. Regardless of whether the issue is a heavier R&D ratio, it also shows that market uncertainty is still playing out fiercely; its stock fell more than 6% at the open the next day.
Unitree's financial performance needs continued observation, and there are four more signals worth watching next:
Monthly financing data starting in November, to test the depth of the cooling;
When the IPO window returns to normal, to test regulators' attitude;
When the second-tier players below Unitree, valued at over 50 billion and 60 billion yuan, will lay out their prospectuses, and what real numbers those prospectuses contain;
The price at which leading companies acquire mid-tier assets, to test the true price tag of an embodied company this winter.
More important than all four of these signals is still one specific scenario: robots truly entering large-scale commercial scenarios to keep working, rather than just throwing punches and dancing on stage. That day will be the starting point of the next wave.
What Li Feifei repeatedly emphasizes is still data, and the commercial scenarios that can continuously generate data.
For embodied intelligence companies, valuation must ultimately return to repeat purchases, delivery, and production-line data; companies that stay at the table must also answer the real account of "what is the gross margin of a single scenario."
Whoever can first make robots create sustainable value in real scenarios will be the first to get a ticket to the next spring. Channel: Finance and Economics. This content is published with the author's authorization; the views represent only the author and do not represent Huxiu's position. If you have objections or complaints about this manuscript, please contact tougao@huxiu.com. Everyone who is changing and wants to change the world is on the Huxiu APP[ ]