Yangtze Memory's STAR Market IPO to raise 33 billion yuan, setting a STAR Market record

[[**Yangtze Memory's STAR Market IPO seeks to raise 33 billion yuan, setting a STAR Market record; Wuhan has bet on the chip industry for twenty years, forming three major industrial chains from memory to optical communications, with its global NAND flash share rising to third.**

**Key points**

**1. Yangtze Memory sets a STAR Market fundraising record and ranks among the global top three**

Yangtze Memory's STAR Market IPO seeks to raise 33 billion yuan, surpassing ChangXin Memory's 29.5 billion yuan and setting a new STAR Market high. By flash shipment volume, its market share reached 14% in the second quarter of 2026, rising to third globally for the first time and overtaking Kioxia and Micron.

**2. Wuhan has bet on the chip industry for twenty years**

Wuhan started in 2006 by building Wuhan Xinxin's 12-inch wafer production line, and did not sell it even after a decade of continued losses. In 2016 the national memory base landed there and Yangtze Memory was established; in 2022 it spent 5.1 billion yuan to buy back control of Yangtze Memory from Tsinghua Unigroup, clearing equity obstacles for the listing.

**3. Self-developed Xtacking architecture breaks through the technology blockade**

Yangtze Memory invented the Xtacking architecture for 3D NAND, placing memory cells and control circuits on two separate wafers and then bonding them, achieving a smaller area and faster speed. In 2019 it mass-produced 64-layer chips, and at the time of its prospectus it was already one of the world's first manufacturers to break through 200 layers.

**4. After sanctions, it pushed for domestic equipment**

After being placed on the U.S. Entity List in 2022, Yangtze Memory worked with domestic equipment makers such as AMEC and NAURA to validate and iterate. In the second half of 2025 it launched a fully domestic pilot production line, with the share of domestic equipment procurement exceeding 50% for the first time, and its mass production plan originally set for 2027 was moved forward to 2026.

**5. Wuhan forms synergy across three major industries: memory, optical communications and displays**

Optics Valley has gathered more than 300 integrated circuit companies, with output value exceeding 120 billion yuan in 2025. Optical communications includes YOFC and Accelink, while display panels include China Star Optoelectronics and Tianma Microelectronics. The Jiufengshan Laboratory provides a pilot testing platform and has already incubated more than 70 companies, accelerating industrial chain synergy. 2026-10-03 22:12 Yangtze Memory's IPO sets a record, Wuhan's big move after twenty years of holding back Coolplay Lab coollabs Quick look

This article comes from the WeChat public account: Coolplay Lab, author: Coolplay Lab

Not long ago ChangXin Memory went public, and Hefei state capital's paper gains exceeded one trillion yuan, making its reputation as the "best venture capitalist" even louder. But many people overlooked Wuhan.

Recently Yangtze Memory's STAR Market IPO was accepted, seeking to raise 33 billion yuan, surpassing ChangXin Memory's planned 29.5 billion yuan and setting the largest planned fundraising scale on the STAR Market. This company, with a top-three global share of NAND flash, is headquartered in Wuhan's Optics Valley.

Ten years ago, Wuhan set aside a piece of land in Optics Valley for memory chips, and at the time no one was optimistic. Yangtze Memory went from poaching talent, building factories and mastering technology, to being sanctioned by the United States all the way, and fought its way to the global top three. Now it is about to go public, and Wuhan's "chip game" is finally about to pay off.

In fact, Wuhan's chip layout is not limited to Yangtze Memory. From memory to optical communications to displays, Wuhan has secured several key positions in the semiconductor industrial chain. Some people wonder, on what basis has Wuhan managed to break out in the chip industry? How big is Wuhan's chip industry map?

01. How has Wuhan bet on chips for more than 20 years?

Many people think Wuhan's chip efforts are a matter of the last ten years, but the starting point is actually much earlier.

Around 2000, Wuhan faced pressure for industrial transformation. At that time Wuhan's industrial foundation was steel, but steel is a heavy-asset, low-growth industry, and urban development needed to find new economic growth points. It happened that in 2000 the state issued a policy encouraging the development of the integrated circuit industry, and Wuhan began to lay out the chip industry.

But policy alone was not enough; at the time Wuhan did not even have a decent chip production line. You cannot pursue chips out of thin air; you need a relevant industrial foundation.

What Wuhan had to show at the time was the optoelectronics industry that Optics Valley had built over twenty years. Starting from pulling China's first optical fiber in 1976, Wuhan became a national leader in optical communications, with Huazhong University of Science and Technology and Wuhan University among its universities, and a batch of companies such as FiberHome, Accelink and YOFC emerging from the postal research institute system. These companies make optical modules and optical fibers, which inherently cannot do without chips.

After reaching a certain level, Wuhan discovered an awkward fact: the most core control chips in optical modules were all imported. Huazhong University of Science and Technology professor Zou Xuecheng said something that circulated in Wuhan's semiconductor circles for many years:

If we do not do this, there will be no name for Wuhan on the map of China's semiconductor industry.

In those years China's semiconductor industry was basically concentrated in Shanghai and Jiangsu. As a central city, Wuhan had no advantage over coastal areas in attracting investment, and lagged behind Beijing in scientific research resources. If Wuhan waited until the chip industry heated up to act, it would completely lose its place in this industry.

So Wuhan first built a production line. In 2006, the Hubei provincial, Wuhan municipal and East Lake High-tech Zone governments pooled tens of billions of yuan to establish Wuhan Xinxin and build a 12-inch wafer production line. 12 inches was the mainstream international chip manufacturing size at the time, and building such a line in the central region was a first.

However, in September 2008, just as the production line went into operation, the global financial crisis arrived.

After Wuhan Xinxin went into production, it mainly did contract manufacturing for an American flash memory company called Spansion, exchanging orders for China's low manufacturing costs. As a result, Spansion itself could not survive the financial crisis and filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009. Wuhan Xinxin's only major customer was gone, orders plummeted, the production line sat idle, and money was burned every day.

At this point, someone proposed selling the production line. TSMC and Micron came to look, and their offers were not low. For Wuhan at the time, stopping the losses, taking the money and doing something else seemed the most rational choice.

But Wuhan did not sell.

Once this production line was sold, Wuhan would truly become a supporting player in the semiconductor industry. Things like the factory buildings, equipment, and team—in the future, even if you wanted to spend money, you might not necessarily be able to build them again. Holding on to this manufacturing platform was equivalent to preserving a seed; only with future opportunities could something be grafted onto it and grow.

Over the next decade, Wuhan Xinxin continued to lose money, but the production line kept running, and neither the team nor R&D was interrupted. In the early days, this line was entrusted to SMIC for management, and some in the industry criticized SMIC for not managing it with much care—after all, it was not SMIC's own fab. In 2013, Wuhan bought back the shares held by SMIC, allowing Xinxin to operate independently, and also brought in former SMIC COO Yang Shining to serve as CEO.

After Wuhan held on to the Xinxin production line, it also waited for a bigger opportunity.

China is the world's largest consumer market for electronic products, but memory chips were once almost entirely imported, and the money spent each year on imported chips exceeded that spent on imported oil. China could not keep being strangled at the choke point. In 2014, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established—the first time the state put real money into semiconductors—to promote the layout of the memory chip industry. Many cities competed for the project, and in the end the state decided to build two memory bases in central China:

One would make DRAM memory in Hefei, and one would make NAND flash in Wuhan.

Why Wuhan? One core reason was that the state wanted a place that could immediately take on the project, not a place that had to be built from scratch. By 2014, Wuhan Xinxin had been established for eight years and had accumulated wafer manufacturing engineering experience, its own technical team, and ready-made factory buildings and equipment—things many other cities did not have.

In March 2016, the national memory base was launched in Wuhan Optics Valley, with a total investment of US$24 billion. But Wuhan Xinxin only had contract manufacturing capability, not its own memory chip technology and brand. The state then brought in Tsinghua Unigroup to take the lead, together with Hubei Science and Technology Investment and the National Big Fund, to establish Yangtze Memory Technologies, folding Wuhan Xinxin's production line and team into it to focus on self-owned-brand NAND flash. Wuhan Xinxin thus became a wholly owned subsidiary of YMTC.

At that time, what Yangtze Memory lacked most was people. In the memory chip industry, R&D, process, and yield ramp-up cannot be handled without more than ten years of accumulated experience. Mainland China did not then have a mature memory talent pool, so it could only recruit from overseas.

Tsinghua Unigroup was then the major shareholder of YMTC, and Chairman Zhao Weiguo personally led the effort. He recruited from Taiwan Gao Qiquan, known as the "godfather of memory." Gao Qiquan had participated in founding Macronix and later rose to chairman of Inotera; he had worked in the memory industry for thirty years. After joining YMTC, he was responsible for the technology direction, and his partner was Yang Shining.

Just after the Lunar New Year in 2017, hundreds of engineers in Taiwan's semiconductor circle collectively changed jobs, with destinations being Wuhan's Yangtze Memory and Hefei's ChangXin. Salaries started at double. Taiwan's media complained every day about the brain drain, but could not stop it.

This group brought memory manufacturing engineering experience to Wuhan, and that is how YMTC's technical foundation was built.

But YMTC's equity later changed. Tsinghua Unigroup expanded through aggressive mergers and acquisitions, and its debt grew larger and larger. In 2021, its liabilities exceeded 200 billion yuan, and creditors applied for bankruptcy reorganization. During the reorganization, Wuhan made a key decision: Hubei Science and Technology Investment contributed 5.1 billion yuan to buy back all of YMTC's equity and creditor's rights held by Tsinghua Unigroup. In the second half of 2022, YMTC completed its industrial and commercial registration change and was no longer a company controlled by Tsinghua Unigroup.

This step was crucial to YMTC's later ability to go public. After Tsinghua Unigroup's blowup, the YMTC equity in its hands could be frozen or auctioned by courts at any time, and the capital market did not dare touch such an uncertain equity structure. Hubei Science and Technology Investment bought back all the equity and creditor's rights, completely defusing this landmine.

Around the same period when YMTC was founded, Wuhan also had another chip project that made a high-profile debut, but its ending was completely different.

In November 2017, Dongxihu District of Wuhan set up Hongxin Semiconductor, claiming a total investment of 128 billion yuan to make 14-nanometer logic chips. In the 2020 Wuhan major project list, Hongxin's investment amount ranked first. Hongxin also brought in Jiang Shangyi as CEO. Jiang Shangyi was former COO of TSMC and was respectfully called "Father Jiang" in the semiconductor industry. His joining made many people think this project might be reliable.

But this project was empty from the root. Hongxin had registered capital of 2 billion yuan; the major shareholder holding 90% was Beijing Guangliang Blueprint, and the state-owned assets of Wuhan's Dongxihu District held the remaining 10%. However, Beijing Guangliang Blueprint's capital contribution was never actually paid in, and the company's actual available startup funds mainly relied on Dongxihu District state-owned assets.

In December 2019, Hongxin held a high-profile ceremony for the entry of a lithography machine into the factory, promoting to the outside that it had introduced "the only lithography machine in China capable of producing 7-nanometer chips." But that machine was actually an ASML DUV lithography machine, not the most advanced EUV; SMIC had ten of the same model. Even more absurdly, just one month after this lithography machine entered the factory, brand new and unopened, it was mortgaged by Hongxin to Wuhan Rural Commercial Bank for a loan of 580 million yuan.

Jiang Shangyi stayed at Hongxin for only one year before resigning. When someone later asked about this experience, he only said: It's hard to explain in a word; it was not a good experience.

In July 2020, Dongxihu District issued an announcement acknowledging that the Hongxin project had a large funding gap and could stall at any time. In November, Dongxihu District state-owned assets increased their stake from 10% to 100% and took over the whole thing. In February 2021, Hongxin notified all employees: there was no plan to resume work on the project, and they had to complete resignation procedures within a deadline.

A chip project billed as worth 100 billion yuan was completely gone in three years.

In the semiconductor industry, having money and scale does not guarantee success; the key is whether a company has technological advantages, industry accumulation, and long-term patience—and this is also the key to Yangtze Memory's rise.

The storage space in your phone for saving photos and installing apps, and the hard drive in your computer for installing the operating system and games, are based on core chips called NAND flash. It and DRAM memory are two brothers: memory is where a computer temporarily stores data while running programs, and the data is gone when power is cut; flash is where things are stored long term, and the data remains even when power is cut.

Only a handful of companies in the world make NAND flash—Samsung, SK Hynix, Micron, Kioxia, and Western Digital—and together they account for more than 85% of the global market. Yangtze Memory was founded only in 2016, at least twenty years later than these giants. How could it catch up with industry giants with decades of history in such a short time?

The key is that it took a unique technological path.

Traditional 3D NAND flash makes the memory cells and the control circuitry on the same silicon wafer. You can imagine it as a building: the rooms are where data is stored, and the corridors and elevators are the control circuitry. The taller the building, the more rooms there are, but the space taken up by corridors and elevators also grows, which is actually uneconomical.

Yangtze Memory developed the Xtacking architecture, which splits this building into two: the memory cells are made on one wafer, and the control circuitry on another. Each is processed using the most suitable process, and then the two wafers are bonded together through billions of tiny connection points.

This has an obvious benefit: the control circuitry can use more advanced logic processes, while the memory cells focus on stacking higher, ultimately resulting in a smaller finished product area, faster speed, and higher density.

In 2017, Yangtze Memory used the existing production line at Wuhan Xinxin to make its first 32-layer chip. In September 2019, 64-layer chips entered mass production, the world's first flash memory mass-produced using the Xtacking architecture. In April 2020, 128-layer chips entered mass production. By the time of the prospectus disclosure, Yangtze Memory was already one of the world's first manufacturers to break through 200 layers.

As its technology caught up, its market position rose accordingly. According to Counterpoint data, in the second quarter of 2026, by flash memory shipments, Samsung accounted for 25%, SK Hynix 22%, and Yangtze Memory 14%, rising to third place globally for the first time and surpassing Kioxia and Micron.

But third place in shipments does not mean making the most money. By revenue, Yangtze Memory ranks only fifth globally. The gap lies in product mix: most of what Yangtze Memory sells is consumer-grade flash used in phones and computers, with low unit prices and thin profits. The most profitable enterprise-grade SSDs, used in data centers, have unit prices several times those of consumer-grade products and were previously basically monopolized by Samsung, Hynix, and Micron. Yangtze Memory's enterprise-grade products only just got started in 2026, and it is still a novice in this market.

As its technology caught up, troubles came on both fronts.

On one front is the patent war. Multiple Micron product models—96-layer, 128-layer, 176-layer, and 232-layer—were accused of infringing Yangtze Memory's patents, involving 27 patents and 295 claims in total. Micron applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to invalidate Yangtze Memory's patents, but the request was rejected.

On the other front is government blockade. In October 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new rules restricting exports of advanced chip manufacturing equipment to China. On December 15 of that year, Yangtze Memory was placed on the Entity List. U.S. equipment makers such as Applied Materials, Lam Research, and KLA completely stopped supplying it, and even maintenance spare parts were no longer provided.

This is a fatal blow to any chip factory. Yangtze Memory's response was to first use domestic equipment wherever possible, fill temporary gaps with non-U.S. equipment, and then advance comprehensive localization step by step. A group of domestic semiconductor equipment companies successively entered Yangtze Memory's production lines—for example, AMEC's etching equipment, Piotech's thin-film deposition equipment, and NAURA's etching and deposition equipment all entered Yangtze Memory's supply chain.

In the second half of 2025, Yangtze Memory launched its first fully domestically produced pilot production line to verify whether domestic equipment could run through the entire process. Construction of the Phase III factory began in 2025, and the share of domestic equipment procurement exceeded 50% for the first time. The fully domestically produced production line originally planned for mass production in 2027 was moved up to the second half of 2026.

It is against this backdrop that Yangtze Memory submitted its STAR Market prospectus. Why choose this particular moment?

First, look at performance. In 2023, Yangtze Memory lost 19.2 billion yuan; in 2024, it earned 6.8 billion yuan; in 2025, it earned 14.2 billion yuan; and in the first quarter of 2026, single-quarter net profit reached 33.4 billion yuan, with a gross margin of 78.7%.

This profit explosion mainly came from industry price increases. In the second quarter of 2026, NAND flash contract prices rose 55% quarter on quarter, and continued to rise in the third quarter. Memory chips are highly homogenized commodities, and prices are determined by global supply and demand; the entire industry basically rises and falls together. Yangtze Memory happens to be at the peak of this price increase cycle.

The listing is because the Phase III factory is expanding production, requiring large investments in plants and equipment, and the 33 billion yuan fundraising is aimed at this. Choosing the peak of the cycle is because profits are best and valuations highest at this time, so the same shares can raise the most money. Once the cycle reverses and prices fall, profits will shrink and valuations will decline with them, making refinancing more costly.

03. Beyond Yangtze Memory,

what does Wuhan's chip industry look like?

Yangtze Memory's IPO is a matter for one company. But looking further out at the chip industry of the entire city of Wuhan, it has already grown from a few saplings into a forest.

Wuhan's integrated circuit industry is mainly concentrated in Optics Valley. Optics Valley now has more than 300 integrated circuit companies, and industry output has risen from less than 5 billion yuan in 2014 to more than 120 billion yuan in 2025. In January this year, Wuhan East Lake High-tech Development Zone teamed up with Yangtze Memory to launch the "Parasol Tree Plan." With Yangtze Memory at the center and a radius of 4.5 kilometers, an industrial circle is being built within a 60-square-kilometer area, drawing in all companies that make equipment, materials, and testing to be next to Yangtze Memory. In August, the first batch of 17 projects signed, with total investment of 6 billion yuan.

Why are companies willing to come? A person from Skyverse said: the chain leader is right next door.

Skyverse mainly makes wafer defect inspection equipment, the process of finding flaws during chip manufacturing. Its R&D center used to be in Shanghai; engineers would fly from Shanghai to Wuhan, then take a taxi to Optics Valley after landing, spending most of the day on the road. Now it has moved its R&D center to Wuhan, and it is a 15-minute drive from the company to the Yangtze Memory production line. If equipment has a problem, they are on site the same day; when Yangtze Memory has a new requirement, it is fed back to R&D the same day.

The "Parasol Tree Plan" brings in mature companies. Beyond that, Wuhan's chip industry ecosystem has three other types of participants.

One type is university professors who start businesses.

HUST professor Yin Zhouping started a business making bonding equipment, the machine in Yangtze Memory's Xtacking architecture that aligns and presses two wafers together, which had always relied on imports. When it was first tested on the Yangtze Memory production line, the yield was only 10%, with more than 200 failure points.

Anywhere else, this team might not have been able to continue, but they are in Wuhan, and their lab is very close to Yangtze Memory. Problems raised on the production line in the morning can be picked up by the R&D team in the afternoon; technical coordination meetings are held regularly every week, and engineers arrive the same day when equipment has problems. Through this kind of close-in iteration, yield rose from 10% to more than 90%, at only one-third the cost of imported equipment.

Another type is small equipment companies from elsewhere that specifically come to set up operations.

In 2023, Wan Xianjin, founder of Xinfeng Precision, moved the company to Wuhan's Dongxihu District to make 12-inch wafer ring-cutting equipment, the process that cuts wafers from a whole silicon ingot, achieving precision of one-tenth the diameter of a hair, surpassing similar overseas products. He chose Wuhan precisely because two major customers, Yangtze Memory and Wuhan Xinxin, are right nearby.

There is also another type incubated through public platforms.

The Jiufengshan Laboratory in Wuhan is the country's only national integrated circuit pilot-testing platform. For small and medium-sized enterprises, building their own test line costs hundreds of millions of yuan, which they cannot afford to burn. Jiufengshan has built 7 process lines running 24 hours a day; companies bring their technical plans to test, and after testing they can go to Yangtze Memory's production lines for mass production. The number of companies incubated and brought in through the laboratory has already reached more than 70.

That these companies and platforms can take root in this ecosystem is inseparable from the industrial foundation built through 20 years of sustained investment by the state and Wuhan.

The earliest was in 2006, when three levels of government pooled tens of billions of yuan to build Wuhan Xinxin. After the national memory base landed in 2016, the National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Phase I invested about 13.6 billion yuan in 2019, and Phase II invested another about 12.9 billion yuan in 2023; Hubei Province, Wuhan City, and East Lake High-tech Development Zone together invested more than 30 billion yuan in local state capital.

Now there are more sources of capital. In September 2025, Yangtze Memory, together with Hubei Changsheng Phase III, contributed 20.72 billion yuan to establish a Phase III company to expand capacity. In early 2026, equity investment funds from the five major state-owned banks landed in Wuhan, and hundred-billion-level patient capital began investing in hard-tech companies, ranking first among central China cities in scale.

Besides memory, Wuhan also has two related industrial lines that have been developed for decades.

One is optical communications. This line has been developed for fifty years and has now formed a complete industrial chain from optical fiber preforms and optical chips to optical modules and optical equipment, and is the country's largest optoelectronic information industry base. YOFC has ranked first globally in optical fiber sales for ten consecutive years, and the optical modules of Accelink Technologies and HGTECH have entered the global top ten.

The other is display panels. Wuhan is an important national base for new display industries and the country's largest production base for small- and medium-sized display panels. China Star Optoelectronics' t3 line is the world's largest LTPS single factory, and Tianma Microelectronics' automotive display shipments have ranked first globally for five consecutive years.

The three industrial lines can integrate and coordinate. For example, the optical chip technology accumulated in optical communications and the semiconductor processes honed in display panels have become the industrial foundation for making memory. Once memory is established, the local market in turn can drive demand for optical modules and panels.

This integration is accelerating. In August this year, Wuhan's HGTECH signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Biwin Storage to jointly make integrated packaging products for memory chips and optical modules. Yangtze Memory also renamed a nearby industrial park "Computing-in-Memory Dual-Innovation Park," recruiting companies that make computing-in-memory chips.

It is still relatively rare for a city to rank among the country's leaders in memory, optical communications, and displays at the same time.

04. The next memory cycle,

Wuhan's opportunities and challenges

For Wuhan, the more important question is: can it catch the next memory cycle?

This round of memory price increases was driven by AI. The storage capacity needed by one AI server has risen from a few TB in the past to hundreds of TB. Cloud providers such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft are frantically locking in long-term memory orders for their large-model businesses. Samsung and SK Hynix have shifted large amounts of capacity to higher-profit HBM high-bandwidth memory and enterprise SSDs, squeezing consumer-grade flash capacity and pushing prices up.

Citi forecasts that in 2027 the global NAND flash market will have a 6.1% supply-demand gap.

Changes in demand have also brought changes in technology roadmaps. AI data centers require storage not only to have large capacity but also to be fast and low-latency, making compute-in-memory and near-memory computing industrial problems that must be solved. Wuhan is already laying out plans: the “Compute-in-Memory Dual-Innovation Park” next to YMTC is recruiting companies working on this type of technology.

This demand is global. Whether Wuhan can secure a larger share of the pie depends on the cards it holds.

The most direct card is production capacity. YMTC already ranks third globally by bit shipments, and capacity will rise further after the third-phase expansion. Memory is a scale business, with costs falling as output rises; the larger the scale, the lower the unit cost.

The second is talent. Wuhan has more than 80 universities, with over one million students enrolled. The School of Microelectronics at Huazhong University of Science and Technology produces a large number of chip design and manufacturing engineers every year. Memory manufacturing, optical communications, and display panels share foundational semiconductor engineering experience, and capabilities such as cleanroom management can be transferred between them, giving engineers a basis for moving across industries.

English text is being prepared.

Of course, shortcomings do exist.

As for the high-end equipment and materials used on Wuhan's production lines, although a group of domestic suppliers has already entered the lines, the most cutting-edge segments are still in the early stage of domestic substitution. In areas such as the most advanced etch machines, thin-film deposition equipment, photoresists, and specialty gases, domestic products are still in the validation stage, and it will take time before they can replace imports on a large scale. Signing the “Wutong Tree Plan” does not equal mass-production supply; there is still a two-to-three-year validation cycle in between.

Chip design is a relatively weak link for Wuhan. Wuhan's current strength lies in manufacturing; YMTC and Wuhan Xinxin are both manufacturing plants.

The number of design companies still lags behind Shanghai and Shenzhen. Manufacturing and design pull each other forward; without design companies nearby, some demand on the manufacturing side goes unanswered.

Another issue is concentration. Wuhan's chip industry currently revolves to a large extent around a single company, YMTC. If YMTC encounters a cyclical downturn, a whole circle of suppliers will come under pressure as well. Wuhan needs to grow more companies that do not depend on YMTC and can stand on their own in the global market.

Wuhan was once an important industrial base in China, with steel and automobiles once supporting half the economy. But after reform and opening up, coastal cities rose rapidly, and Wuhan's position in the national economic map shifted backward for a time.

In recent years, Wuhan has transformed all the way from a traditional industrial city, deepening its presence in memory, optical communications, displays, and other industries, and has become an important city in the country's hard-tech landscape. In the first half of this year, Wuhan's GDP was 1.12 trillion yuan, ranking ninth nationwide. More noteworthy is the structural change: high-tech manufacturing accounted for 38.4% of the value added of industrial enterprises above designated size, surpassing for the first time the combined total of the four traditional industries of automobiles, steel, petrochemicals, and tobacco.

The memory industry's cycles rise and fall as a matter of course, while the technological transformation brought by AI has only just begun. Wuhan has already accumulated a foundation in capacity, technology, talent, and supply chains, but how to turn short-term industry dividends into long-term, solid industrial advantages still has to be tested by the market.

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