Hard Discount Three-Way Battle: Chaohe Suan NB Leads with Nearly 700 Stores, Aldi Speeds Up, Happy Monkey Chases Hard
As of late October, Hema's Chaohe Suan NB stores have approached 700, covering about 33 cities; Aldi has 131 stores with a year-end target of over 150; and Meituan's Happy Monkey has about 109 stores in operation over 14 months. Aldi and Chaohe Suan NB have net margins of about 3%; Happy Monkey has the lowest gross margin at about 15% and average daily sales of about 100,000 yuan. Aldi's private-label share exceeds 90%, Chaohe Suan NB's is about 60%, and Happy Monkey's "Monkey Brand" is about 50% and is planned to rise to 80%.
Body · AI translation
[[**In 2026, the top three hard-discount players are accelerating expansion: Chaohe Suan NB leads with nearly 700 stores, Aldi has proven its single-store model, and Happy Monkey is catching up fast through a platform ecosystem; the focus of competition is shifting from store-opening speed to sustainable low prices and profitable single-store models.**
**Key points**
**1. Chaohe Suan NB leads on scale, Aldi is steady, and Happy Monkey is still catching up**
As of late October, Chaohe Suan NB had nearly 700 stores covering about 33 cities; Aldi had 131 stores with a year-end target of more than 150; and Happy Monkey, in just 14 months, had about 109 stores in operation covering 18 cities.
**2. Three models correspond to three expansion speeds**
Chaohe Suan NB relies on building its warehouse network first and diluting costs through density; Aldi sticks to self-operated density and private labels; Happy Monkey reuses Meituan's supply chain and rider network, trading scale for bargaining power and instant-retail synergies.
**3. Single-store profitability is the real threshold for hard discount**
Aldi and Chaohe Suan NB have net margins of about 3%, with the latter relying on density to compress logistics and shrinkage; Happy Monkey has the lowest gross margin at about 15% and average daily sales of about 100,000 yuan, and may be trading losses for market share.
**4. Private-label scale determines the sustainability of low prices**
Private labels account for more than 90% at Aldi, about 60% at Chaohe Suan NB, and about 50% at Happy Monkey's "Monkey Brand," which plans to raise that to 80%; private labels need to reach minimum order quantities to support a price advantage.
**5. Site selection is converging, while cross-region replication capability is diverging**
All three started from high-frequency scenarios in mature communities in the Yangtze River Delta and avoided high-end shopping malls; Aldi validates first and then expands in clusters, Chaohe Suan NB builds its warehouse network first, and Happy Monkey relies on Meituan heat maps and AI site selection. 2026-11-05 18:01 The three hard-discount giants in a melee: Hema leads, Aldi speeds up, Happy Monkey chases hard Lianshang.com quick overview
This article is from the WeChat public account: Lianshang.com, author: Lianshang.com editorial department
The real threshold of hard discount has never been about beating prices down, but about making low prices sustainable.
The full text is about 4,200 words and takes about 10 minutes to read
In 2026, the hard-discount track entered a period of concentrated explosion.
Chaohe Suan NB, the affordable community supermarket under Hema, has clearly accelerated expansion: it entered South China in January, Beijing in June, Chengdu in July, and Tianjin in October, basically completing a preliminary layout across East China, South China, North China, and Southwest China. As of late October, its national store count was close to 700, with about 200 new stores during the year, covering about 33 cities.
Aldi's official website shows that as of October 30 it had 131 stores in China, with a year-end target of more than 150. They are currently mainly distributed in Shanghai and Jiangsu, and it will enter Anhui in November. This year it plans to open about 60 new stores, double the pace of previous years.
Meanwhile, Happy Monkey, the community supermarket brand under Meituan that started only 14 months ago, had about 109 stores in operation as of October 30, covering 18 cities, including 45 in Guangdong and 38 in Zhejiang, with more than 100 new stores added during the year.
However, large scale does not necessarily mean strength. At present, Chaohe Suan NB and Aldi are in the first tier, while Happy Monkey is still in the second tier. This track is not about who becomes the scale leader first, but about who first proves a replicable and profitable single-store model.
Three genes, three speeds
Chaohe Suan NB follows the "density dilution" route. Its national stores cover about 33 cities, and the high-density network of nearly 200 stores in Shanghai continuously shortens warehouse-delivery radii, reducing logistics costs and fresh-produce shrinkage.
Chaohe Suan NB relies overwhelmingly on self-operated stores, with franchising cautiously opened only within the Yangtze River Delta supply chain radius; products, prices, and operations are all tightly controlled by headquarters, making them almost no different from direct-operated stores.
Veteran industry insider Wang Yu (pseudonym) believes that opening the franchise channel actually helps profitability: headquarters revenue is built on supply chain scale effects, and the return on individual investment is clearer.
Aldi follows the "self-operated density" route. It built its supply chain from scratch, densely deployed stores with Shanghai as the core region, built warehouse and distribution centers for radius coverage, and diluted fixed costs through store density. It benefits from the dividend of its parent company ALDI's model—private labels, self-operation, and high turnover build its moat.
In the view of Wang Guoping, a member of the Lianshang senior advisory group, Aldi started slowly and very steadily. After going through a premium line phase, it returned to the discount line, using six years to repeatedly verify in Shanghai whether "community hard discount can work."
Of course, slow does not mean inefficient. Mature Aldi China stores have daily sales of about 130,000 yuan per store. Affected by the ramp-up of new stores, overall average annual revenue per store is about 36 million yuan, and sales per square meter are about 2.3 times that of traditional supermarkets, precisely confirming the value of this single-store model.
It is just that this approach is heavy: capital, supply chain, and warehousing and distribution all have to be in place first before points, lines, and areas can be rolled out step by step, so it must be done steadily.
In October 2026, Aldi China CEO Chen Jia confirmed in an interview: "Aldi's single-store model in China has been proven, and operations are steady." She also made clear: "Private labels are not an independent project of Aldi, nor a single strategy; they are our business model."
This means Aldi is using private labels to reconstruct products, supply chain, costs, and store operations.
Relying on Meituan, Happy Monkey follows the "platform ecosystem" route. Apart from Chaohe Suan NB, it is the fastest-expanding brand on the entire track this year, with stores spanning East China, North China, and South China. It reuses Meituan's already-built supply chain advantages, connects integrated stores and warehouses to the rider network, and rolls out on a large scale with financial support.
Wang Guoping pointed out that last year Happy Monkey basically completed preliminary models for product structure and store formats in first- and second-tier cities and lower-tier markets in Beijing, Hangzhou, and Langfang; in the first half of this year it conducted replication validation, and in the second half it began rolling out across the board.
"In the Fujian market, Happy Monkey is more aggressive than Chaohe Suan NB. Right now, entering Fujian—with Xiamen, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Fuzhou all preparing to roll out simultaneously—using scale to dilute costs is its only way to survive."
Wang Yu stated that when Happy Monkey opened stores, the "hard discount" format had already been validated; Aldi's early stage belonged to the "validating the single-store model" phase. The two are at different stages, so differences in store-opening speed are normal.
The difference in the three companies' store-opening speeds depends on the business logic behind them: Happy Monkey needs to open stores quickly to rapidly build supply scale and establish a price advantage. Aldi's strategy focuses more on long-term planning and steadily expanding scale. Chaohe Suan NB's logic is to build the model through self-operated stores, expand scale through franchise stores, and win through the supply chain.
In his view, "Aldi's advantage is its product planning and development capability; Chaohe Suan NB's advantage is a clear positioning, with very clear site selection and product strategies. Leading in scale means strong product negotiation capability and guaranteed price advantages. At the same time, product concepts validated by Hema can be replicated in Chaohe Suan NB; Happy Monkey's advantage is the rapid expansion and rapid trial-and-error of an internet company backed by capital."
Three routes, three approaches
Specifically on the site selection path, Aldi's route has a distinct "validate first, then cluster" feature. From 2019 to 2025 it operated only in Shanghai, and only in April 2025 did it leave Shanghai, landing in Suzhou and Wuxi; afterward it densified along southern Jiangsu and advanced into central Jiangsu.
Next, in November it will enter the Anhui market, with the first six stores in Hefei and Wuhu scheduled to open on November 21; in the Zhejiang market, the first 11 stores in Hangzhou are expected to open in batches in early January 2027.
Generally, before crossing provinces, Aldi is accustomed to first laying out the entity and supply chain. On July 17, Aldi Commercial (Hangzhou) Co., Ltd. completed business registration, with registered capital of 10 million yuan.
On the supply chain side, Aldi has built a fresh produce direct procurement base in Jiaxing, which, together with the East China regional distribution center in Putuo, Shanghai, the central kitchen in Jinshan, Shanghai, the cold-chain warehouse in Kunshan, as well as the Wuxi distribution center to be put into use in March 2026 and the Nanjing logistics center to be launched in October, is forming a Yangtze River Delta supply network with "Shanghai, Wuxi, Kunshan, and Jiaxing" as core nodes, and the Nanjing warehouse radiating northward and westward to Jiangsu and Anhui.
Chaohe Suan NB's route is more like "warehouse network first, density priority." After more than two years of regional trial runs in East China, it began accelerating national expansion in 2026. Its expansion does not rely on customer spillover from a single core city, but advances through a dual-layer structure of "warehouse network + store network": first deploy warehouses, then open stores, ensuring that a region is "opened densely and opened well" before continuing to expand into new regions.
Its core site selection principle is "extreme convenience," with many locations at the foot of residential buildings, on community streets, and in neighborhood centers, serving three meals a day for households within 3 kilometers. On the cost side, it lowers costs through direct sourcing from the source, minimalist decoration, digital replenishment, and integrated store-warehouse fulfillment.
Regarding franchising, Chaohe Suan NB is relatively restrained. Starting in November 2025, it first piloted in Shanghai, Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou, and in October 2026 expanded to 11 cities in the Yangtze River Delta; cities such as Beijing and Guangzhou have not yet opened franchising, and overall it remains mainly self-operated.
This means that Chaohe Suan NB's national expansion speed will ultimately still depend on whether the warehouse network radius, local supply chain, and single-store profitability model can keep pace simultaneously.
Happy Monkey's map is drawn in another way. In August 2025 it opened the country's first store in Hangzhou, and by the end of 2025 it had only 7; after entering 2026 the pace accelerated: about 51 by the end of July, 58 in mid-August, 68 in late August, and surpassing 100 on September 30.
Happy Monkey's urgency is essentially that Meituan wants to use density to exchange for supply chain bargaining power and instant retail synergy, rather than for a pretty single-store income statement. This explains why it must do private labels and why it is willing to continue pushing for speed at a scale of 100 stores.
Who is better suited to shopping malls?
All three will enter shopping malls. Malls use rent discounts to exchange for opening-period traffic, and brands use low-cost locations to exchange for exposure; each side gets what it needs.
Wang Guoping pointed out that brands pursuing a low-price, cost-effective route usually face higher costs when entering shopping malls; some shopping malls are willing to exchange rent discounts for first-round trial benefits, but cost-effective merchants contribute "cost-effective traffic," making secondary monetization more difficult.
Currently, Aldi has the highest proportion of mall stores. Wang Yu believes that Aldi's brand positioning, target customers, and profit model are relatively more suitable for shopping malls. Its stores are mostly 500–1,200 square meters, with SKUs controlled within 2,000; this type of store format is easier to negotiate with property owners.
Aldi prefers mature community shopping malls, commercial properties above subway stations, and existing renovation projects. It does not enter high-end shopping malls or new urban areas with low occupancy rates. It often locates on B1 or F1 floors and is willing to take over spaces vacated by fast fashion or traditional supermarkets. The soon-to-open Hangzhou Qingchun Yintai store is converted from a former Uniqlo space.
Chaohe Suan NB's site selection logic is closer to "at the doorstep." It prioritizes street-level shops in mature old residential communities, community neighborhood centers, the first or basement floor of community shopping malls, and mixed residential and industrial park areas, avoiding core CBDs and prime shops in high-rent commercial districts.
Store areas are divided into compact street stores of 500–650 square meters and standard neighborhood center stores of 700–800 square meters. It calculates foot traffic around a 500-meter walking circle, a 500–1,500-meter cycling circle, and a 1.5–3-kilometer outer circle, requiring a resident population of more than 40,000 within 1 kilometer, and strictly controls the rent ceiling.
Happy Monkey stores fall into three types: community stores (700–800 square meters), mall stores (700–900 square meters), and street-front stores (600–700 square meters), with more than 1,500 SKUs.
Its site selection clearly avoids high-end shopping malls and high-end communities, relies heavily on Meituan's consumer heat maps and AI site selection, and prefers community street-front stores unless the mall offers favorable commercial terms. The combination of the Foshan Hengfu GOGOPARK flagship store and the Hujingwan community store is a concrete example of the "mall + community" approach.
For malls, the three brands' value propositions each have different emphases: Aldi revitalizes idle shop spaces at low cost and keeps everyday shopping within the venue; Chaohe Suan NB is better at turning quiet existing commercial properties into daily community traffic gateways and driving footfall to merchants on the same floor; Happy Monkey, in addition to offline traffic, can also take on Meituan instant retail orders, turning a single shop into a fulfillment node covering 3–5 kilometers.
During the leasing phase of Zhijiangli in Zhuangtang, Hangzhou, residents were once asked to vote on brands, and Aldi won by a wide margin, which also shows community-oriented retail's preference for high-frequency, essential-demand brands.
English text is being prepared.
Hard discount track competes on scale first
The common financial characteristics of hard discount are "three lows and one high": low SKU count, low gross margin, low expenses, and high turnover.
Industry estimates put its gross margin at about 15%. The same model in ALDI's mature global markets can achieve net profit of around 5%, but in China, squeezed layer upon layer by price wars and the heavier, more competitive fresh food business, net margin is only about 2% after deducting headquarters expenses and miscellaneous costs, and rent plus labor must be kept within 10% of sales.
According to estimates by Linkshop, Aldi's comprehensive gross margin is about 20%, not low within hard discount, with a net margin of about 3%. It balances this through a three-tier product structure: fresh food and ultra-value series use low margins to drive traffic, the middle tier stabilizes the base, and categories such as 3R (ready-to-eat, ready-to-heat, ready-to-cook), beauty and personal care provide higher margins. A mature store has daily sales of about 130,000 yuan.
Chaohe Suan NB's comprehensive gross margin is about 19%, lower than Aldi's, with a net margin of about 3%. Its profitability depends on density: the denser the stores, the shorter the warehousing and distribution radius, and the more controllable logistics and shrinkage. A mature store has daily sales of about 130,000 yuan. This model works in high-density areas of the Yangtze River Delta, but whether cross-regional replication can maintain the same shrinkage and turnover remains a variable.
Happy Monkey's comprehensive gross margin is about 15%, the lowest of the three, with average daily sales per store of about 100,000 yuan. Wang Guoping pointed out that Happy Monkey may be losing money to build the market, but it revitalizes Meituan's idle capacity, which is positive for Meituan as a whole; once scale comes up, back-end costs will be quickly diluted. "You can't look at a single store alone; you have to see how it balances its internal finances."
The share of private labels is the hardest indicator in hard discount. Aldi has about 2,000 SKUs, with private labels accounting for more than 90%; it has developed 15 private labels, and has more than 600 SKUs priced at 9.9 yuan or below. Chaohe Suan NB's private label share is about 60%, with about 1,500 SKUs.
Happy Monkey's private label "Monkey Brand" accounts for about 50%, expected to rise to 80% in the future, rolling out across the store's more than 1,500 SKUs in three lines: fresh food, 3R, and standard products.
Wang Yu said that the hard discount track will still compete on scale first. If private labels lack scale, prices cannot be supported, and even minimum order quantities are hard to reach. Scale-driven growth is the top priority; after reaching economic scale, product selection and supply chains can be optimized in tandem.
From local experiments to head-on confrontation
For the Hangzhou market, Aldi's entry is a clear signal: hard discount is no longer just a local experiment in Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta, but is beginning to enter broader community consumption scenarios.
But opening stores is not the end point. In an interview, Chen Jia gave three dimensions by which Aldi judges store success: whether consumers are willing to visit the store, whether they are willing to spend, and whether they will repurchase. She also emphasized: "Low prices attract consumers into the store the first time, but only quality can retain consumers and bring repurchases."
For Aldi, the first battle in Zhejiang tests whether its self-operated density model can continue to be replicated across regions; for Chaohe Suan NB, after opening up franchising in the Yangtze River Delta, whether Hangzhou store density and supply chain radius can continue to dilute costs is worth watching; for Happy Monkey, whether it can achieve stable profitability in more cities still needs time to verify.
The real threshold of hard discount has never been about pushing prices down, but about making low prices sustainable. Aldi has already proven it, Chaohe Suan NB is verifying it, and Happy Monkey is still climbing. The competition ahead will be crueler than the speed of store openings: only those whose individual stores can support themselves have the right to talk about scale.
Which of the three models do you favor more?
Welcome to leave comments and interact in the channel: Business Consumption. This content comes from the internet and the original link; the views represent only the author and do not represent Huxiu's position. If there is any copyright issue, please contact hezuo@huxiu.com, and we will verify and handle it promptly. Everyone who is changing the world and wants to change the world is on the Huxiu APP[ ]]]