Modal 回应 Hugging Face 智能体入侵事件：平台隔离未被攻破
A note on the Hugging Face agent incident
Modal 就 Hugging Face 公布的智能体入侵时间线作出回应，称其平台与隔离机制未被攻破。涉事环境是某客户自己的应用，部署在无需认证即可公开访问的端点，用于在 Modal Sandbox 中编译执行互联网上任何人提交的代码，攻击者获得的代码执行发生在该客户自己的容器内，未影响其他客户工作负载。Modal 强调公开暴露并非默认设置，建议对公网暴露服务启用认证、IP 白名单并限制出站网络。
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Hugging Face published a technical timeline of a recent agent intrusion, which names Modal as the third-party infrastructure the agent used as a launchpad.
Modal's platform and isolation were not compromised in any way.
The environment involved was a customer's own application. It was deployed to a endpoint that was publicly accessible without authentication, and it was designed to compile and execute code submitted by anyone on the internet in a Modal Sandbox. The code execution the attacker obtained took place inside that customer's own container, within Modal's standard sandbox isolation boundary. No other customer workloads were affected.
While customers can expose Sandboxes to unauthenticated traffic, this is never the default, and Modal provides the authentication, network, and monitoring controls to keep production workloads locked down. We recommend that anything exposed to the public internet require authentication, IP allowlist, restrict its outbound network access to only what it needs, and treat any code or input it accepts from users as untrusted.
For additional questions, email security@modal.com.